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I. INTRODUCTION
Would you buy property near a contaminated site? The phenome-
non known as stigma occurs when potential purchasers devalue the
cost of property associated with environmental contamination due to
their fear of contamination. Even when a particular piece of property
has not been, and could never be, adversely impacted by nearby con-
tamination, its value frequently will decrease in the eyes of potential
purchasers as a result of their fear.'
The following question of course arises: absent any potential for
actual harm, should the polluter be responsible for the damage result-
ing from this fear? While the number of claims for such devaluation
asserted by owners of stigmatized property is rising dramatically,2 the
judicial answer to this question has been anything but clear. This Ar-
ticle identifies the source of the current inadequate judicial treatment
1. Stigma claims can be separated into two factually distinct groups based on their
treatment. The first type of stigma damage claim is based on a property's prox-
imity to a source of contamination, even though the property has not and will not
be impacted by the contamination. This type of stigma claim is of special impor-
tance due in part to the number of people who may bring such a claim against a
source of contamination. Frequently, the number of proximate property owners
is substantial, and class actions for such damages have been certified. Damages
awarded in this type of case frequently amount to tens of millions of dollars.
These types of stigma damage claims will be referred to throughout this Article
as "proximity stigma" claims.
The second type of stigma claim deals with contaminated property that has
been remediated. This type of stigma will be referred to as "postremediation
stigma" throughout this Article.
2. Numerous factors have resulted in the increased assertion of such stigma dam-
age claims. The continued erosion of the doctrine of caveat emptor and the in-
crease in legislative or judicial rules requiring disclosure of property conditions to
prospective buyers increases the number of cases in which property cannot be
sold at market price due to disclosure of prior or nearby contamination. Also,
experts in the field of real estate appraisal have begun to develop a significant
understanding of the effects of contamination on real property values and, per-
haps more important to the litigation context, have begun to develop methods to
quantify the diminution in value that results from these effects. Finally, as the
number of stigma damage claims continues to rise, judicial decisions allowing
recovery of such damages have themselves created an incentive to better under-
stand and prove the effects of stigma. All of these factors will continue to create
an incentive to seek recovery of stigma damages. For a detailed analysis of this
changing legal trend and its effect on stigma damage claims see, Timothy J.
Muldowney & Kendall W. Harrison, Stigma Damages: Property Damage and the
Fear of Risk, 62 DEF. CouNs. J. 525 (1995). For examples of the approaches to
stigma appraisal, see James A. Chalmers & Scott A. Roehr, Issues in the Valua-
tion of Contaminated Property, 61 APsSAL J. 28 (1993); Lorraine Lewandrow-
ski, Toxic Blackacre: Appraisal Techniques and Current Trends in Valuation, 5
ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 55 (1994); Bill Mundy, Stigma and Value, 60 APPRAsAL J.
7 (1991); Peter J. Patchin, Contaminated Properties-Stigma Revisited, 59 AP-
PRAusAL J. 167 (1991); Peter J. Patehin, Valuation of Contaminated Properties, 56
APPRAISAL J. 7 (1988); Albert Wilson, A Valuation Model for Environmental Risk,
Focus, Jan. 15, 1990, at 17-20.
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of stigma. It argues that courts and practitioners misunderstand the
process that causes stigma harm and, as a result, have fashioned a
jurisprudence that is unresponsive to the problem. It then identifies a
proper model of stigma harm and builds a new stigma jurisprudence
based on this psycho-social model of the stigma phenomenon.
The most fundamental problem underlying the inadequate judicial
treatment of stigma claims is that courts and lawyers simply misun-
derstand the phenomenon that causes stigma.3 While courts and com-
mentators treat stigma harm in terms of the potential for
contamination to reoccur or the potential for residual contamination
to impact health or property, this Article argues that stigma is the
result of a cognitive "marking" process, completely independent of the
potential for future actual harm. According to the cognitive model, the
harm results from a mark that, when noticed, "changes in a negative
and discrediting way the way the observer sees the victim, whose
identity is now spoiled."4 In short, the harm from stigma is to reputa-
tion and not to property. This redefinition of stigma also is supported
by research on heuristics, or cognitive shortcuts, which explain the
variations in perception that result in stigmas having different magni-
tude and duration depending on surrounding circumstances.
The lack of understanding of the stigma phenomenon has led
courts to fashion rules of liability and damages that advance few, if
any, valid policy concerns. For example, to the extent a majority rule
of stigma jurisprudence can be established, it would mirror other cur-
rent theories of recovery for "subjective" damages, with claims allowed
only if the diminution in property value accompanies some actual
harm.5 This liability rule, however, runs contrary to the concept of
the marking process as independent of the means by which contami-
nation causes actual property damage. Simply put, this actual dam-
age standard bears no relationship to whether a party has been
harmed by stigma.
Moreover, the reasons generally asserted by courts for requiring an
actual damage standard are inapplicable to stigma harm. Generally,
3. Commentators attribute stigma to such causes as the fear of health impacts asso-
ciated with environmental contamination, and the fear that one may have to pay
for remediation of contamination in the future. See, e.g., Andrew N. Davis &
Santo Longo, Stigma Damages in Environmental Cases: Developing Issues and
Implications for Industrial and Commercial Real Estate Transactions, 25 Envtl.
L. Rep. 10345 (July 1995). Others also point to the uncertainty that accompanies
the fear as playing a significant role in the creation of stigma. See, e.g., Mundy,
supra, note 2, at 9. A more detailed analysis of the basis for stigma will be under-
taken after a review of existing stigma jurisprudence. See infra Part IlI.
4. See MICHAEL R. EDELSTEIN, CONTAMINATED ComusuNirIs: THE SOCIAL AND Psy-
CHOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF RESIDENTIAL Toxi ExposuRs (1988).
5. In the case of postremediation stigma, in which properties have been actually
impacted by contamination, courts analyze whether the stigma is permanent
such that nuisance recovery would be allowed.
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such liability standards are premised on the problems associated with
proving "subjective" harm. Usually, the only way to present evidence
on the subjective response to contamination would be to put the in-
jured person on the witness stand and ask for a description of his feel-
ings. Yet, stigma is the product of market forces. It can be proved
through means other than the subjective feelings of the plaintiff and
objectively verified through appraisal evidence. Stigma liability rules
need not provide for the same high level of protection required in
many "subjective" cases. At the same time, an analysis of heuristics
suggests that many stigmas are not permanent, and thus judicial
analysis of damages rules also must be reconsidered. In light of this
new understanding of stigma, this Article concludes that the best ap-
proach to stigma damages would be to turn the current majority juris-
prudence upside down-applying a stricter standard for proving
damages than for liability.
This Article is separated into three major parts. Part II sets forth
the current state of stigma jurisprudence through an analysis of ex-
isting stigma case law. Part III then describes the cognitive model of
stigma. It focuses on the marking process that causes stigma and uses
heuristics to describe why certain stigmas are perceived as larger
than others. Finally, Part IV considers the implications of this new
understanding for current stigma jurisprudence, suggesting a proper
legal basis for consideration of stigma claims.
II. CURRENT STIGMA JURISPRUDENCE
Current environmental stigma jurisprudence, with decisions being
made on an ad hoc basis, is best characterized as confused. Some of
the confusion in stigma jurisprudence can be traced to the variety of
legal claims asserted as a basis for stigma recovery and the disparate
judicial treatment these claims receive. Claims to recover stigma
damages have been based in such common law theories as nuisance
and negligence, 6 and have also been asserted under statutory author-
ity such as CERCLA.7 Another source of confusion has been the de-
velopment of competing precedent in both the postremediation and
proximity nuisance context. As more courts have begun to accept
stigma damage claims, this split in authority has become more signifi-
cant. Thus, while the number of stigma claims continues to increase,
6. See, e.g., Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 1992)(applying
nuisance theory as the basis of a stigma claim); Adams v. Star Enter., 851 F.
Supp. 770 (E.D. Va. 1994)(analyzing a stigma claim based in negligence), affd, 51
F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 1995).
7. Comprehensive Environment Response Compensation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1995)[hereinafter CERCLAI. See, e.g., Berry v. Armstrong
Rubber Co., 989 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1993)(analyzing a stigma claim founded in
nuisance as'well as in CERCLA).
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the manner in which they are judicially construed becomes more
uncertain.
A significant portion of the confusion in current stigma jurispru-
dence can be traced to the different nuisance law requirements and
the varied interpretations of these requirements in different states.
The vast majority of stigma claims are premised on a theory of nui-
sance. Since its initial acceptance, the common law nuisance claim
has developed differently in different states. Moreover, courts in
states that do apply similar nuisance requirements may interpret
these requirements differently. As a result, state nuisance law is not
at all universal.
The confusion created by the application of differing nuisance re-
quirements is exacerbated because stigma damages themselves are
hard to characterize. Of particular importance to judicial decision-
making is the characterization of the source or basis of the stigma as-
sociated with a particular piece of property. Some courts have
suggested stigma has a basis in personal discomfort or injury to the
neighborhood. 8 Others suggest stigma is the result of unfounded
news stories and rumors. 9 Commentators generally characterize
stigma as fear or possibility of future harm.' 0 The varying legal stan-
dards and interpretation of nuisance law combined with the difficulty
many courts encounter in attempting to define stigma has created
substantial confusion in environmental stigma jurisprudence.
Such a varied jurisprudence defies ready description, and thus any
attempt at description must be subject to the caveat that not every
case will be neatly categorized. Moreover, the organizing characteris-
tics chosen by the Author certainly are not the only shared character-
istics of the various stigma cases. This being said, some trends in
decisionmaking do seem more significant than others. This Part con-
siders some of the more important stigma cases in an attempt to distill
from them these important general themes.
This Part treats the factually distinct proximity and postremedia-
tion cases separately. Because the vast majority of stigma cases are
premised on nuisance claims, this Part focuses on the application of
nuisance law in both the proximity and postremediation stigma con-
texts. After examining relevant nuisance law issues, this Part turns
8. See Acadian Heritage Realty, Inc. v. City of Lafayette, 394 So. 2d 855 (La. Ct.
App. 1981); Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 728 (Mich.
1992)(Levin, J., dissenting).
9. Berry v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 989 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1993); Adkins v. Thomas
Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Mich. 1992)(Boyle, J., dissenting).
10. See Anthony Z. Roisman & Gary E. Mason, Nuisance and the Recovery of
"Stigma" Damages: Eliminating the Confusion, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. 10070, 10071
(Feb. 1996).
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to the other legal theories upon which proximity and postremediation
claims have been premised.
A. Proximity Stigma Jurisprudence
The number of cases in which individuals seek recovery for dam-
ages due to their property's proximity to a contaminated environmen-
tal site continues to rise. It is extremely unlikely that this trend will
moderate any time in the near future as courts continue to embrace
new precedent allowing recovery in such instances." Even in light of
this new case law, however, the majority of courts still disallow recov-
ery in these cases.
1. Denial of Nuisance-Based Proximity Stigma Claims:
Interpreting Substantial Interference to Require
Actual Impact
Judicial analysis of proximity stigma nuisance claims focuses on
the element of nuisance law' 2 that requires the nuisance to result in a
11. See MHE Assocs. v. United Musical Instruments, USA, Inc., No. 93CV1883, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5808 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 1995); DeSario v. Indus. Excess Land-
fill, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
12. Prosser and Keeton define the elements of a nuisance as follows:
(1) The defendant acted with the intent of interfering with the use and
enjoyment of land by those entitled to that use;
(2) There was some interference with the use and enjoyment of the
land of the kind intended, although the amount and extent of that
interference may not have been anticipated or intended;
(3) The interference that resulted and the physical harm, if any, from
that interference proved to be substantial. It is this requirement
and that next that is most important in distinguishing between
trespassory-type invasions from those that are actionable on a nui-
sance theory. Any intentional and unprivileged entry on land is a
trespass without a showing of damage, since those who own land
have an exclusive right to its use; but an act that interferes with use
but is not in itself a use is not actionable without damage. The sub-
stantial interference requirement is to satisfy the need for showing
that the land is reduced in value because of the defendant's conduct;
(4) The interference that came about under such circumstances was of
such a nature, duration or amount as to constitute unreasonable
interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs § 87, at 622-
23 (5th ed. 1984).
Private nuisance is defined by the Restatement as "a nontrespassory invasion
of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land." An individual is
subject to liability for such an invasion if(a) the plaintiff has "property rights and
privileges respect to the use enjoyment with" which has been interfered; (b) the
invasion is either (1) "intentional and unreasonable," or (2) "unintentional and
otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability" for negligent, reckless,
or ultrahazardous conduct. RESTATEENT (SEcOND) OF ToRs §§ 821D-F, 822
(1987).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of property.' 3
Some states have interpreted the substantial interference element as
requiring proof of some actual physical interference with property.14
Under such an interpretation, proximity stigma claims premised on a
nuisance theory will, by definition, fail. Other courts hold that physi-
cal invasion is not required to satisfy the substantial interference re-
quirement. Nevertheless, these courts may still deny proximity
stigma claims if they find on the particular facts that the interference
is only nominal.
One of the most thorough treatments of the proximity stigma issue
and an excellent starting point for an analysis of proximity stigma ju-
risprudence is the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Adkins v.
Thomas Solvent Co.15 The majority decision and strong dissent illus-
trate the problematic nature of applying current nuisance law princi-
ples to stigma type injuries, as well as the extremely narrow difference
between what may or may not amount to substantial interference.
Adkins was an appeal of a Michigan trial court decision that
granted summary judgment for the defendant on the nuisance claims
for property devaluation brought by twenty-two individuals who lived
near the defendant's contaminated site.16 The twenty-two individuals
were part of a larger group of plaintiffs who had sued Thomas Solvent
Company for various types of damages and injunctive relief as the re-
sult of the company's allegedly improper handling and disposal of
toxic waste.17 As discovery in the case developed, it became apparent
that due to a divide that separated groundwater flow in the area,
these twenty-two plaintiffs' properties, unlike the properties of the
other plaintiffs in the case, would never be physically impacted by the
contamination.' 8 The defendant sought summary judgment against
these plaintiffs based on this information.
The decisions of both the trial and appellate courts turned on the
issue of whether a party must plead actual physical impact of con-
taminants to satisfy the substantial interference requirement.' 9
Holding that nuisance law required a showing of actual contamina-
13. While most case law turns on the application of the substantial interference re-
quirement, another issue that confronts plaintiffs in stigma claims based on a
nuisance (or trespass) theory is whether the nuisance is temporary or permanent.
Diminution in property value will be recoverable only when the nuisance is
deemed permanent. Although applicable in the proximity stigma context, this
issue is generally the focal point of postremediation stigma claims. Therefore, it
will be discussed in detail infra section H.B.
14. For a detailed analysis of the purpose of the substantial interference require-
ment, see infra subsection II.A.2.
15. 487 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 1992).
16. Id. at 725.
17. Id. at 717.
18. Id. at 718.
19. Id. at 720.
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tion, the trial court granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs.
The Michigan Court of Appeals, however, found that Michigan courts
did not interpret substantial interference as requiring allegations of
actual physical invasion of property and thus reversed the trial court's
decision.20 The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to consider
the appellate court's decision. 2 1
Upon review, the Michigan Supreme Court expanded its analysis
beyond the issue of whether physical harm was required to satisfy the
substantial interference requirement. While the supreme court
agreed with the appellate court that physical invasion is unnecessary
to satisfy the requirement, it held that unfounded allegations of dimi-
nution in property value, without more, did not constitute significant
interference.
In reaching this conclusion, the court first considered the meaning
of and the rationale behind the substantial interference requirement.
Starting with the confusing relationship between the law of nuisance
and trespass, it noted that "[t]he tort of trespass later developed to
remedy [the] situation in which the defendant interfered with the
complainant's interest in land. The source of injury was always on the
complainant's land. Later, the assize of nuisance arose to redress in-
jury due to an act of the defendant that interfered with the complain-
ant's interest, although the injury did not involve an entry onto the
complainant's land."2 2
Nuisance claims were thus quite broad and could be brought for
any number of activities including "interference with the physical con-
dition of the land itself, disturbance in the comfort or conveniences of
the occupant including his piece of mind, and threat of future injury
that is a present menace and interference with enjoyment."2 3 To limit
the scope of this broad entitlement, courts added the requirement that
a litigant show more than just interference. Plaintiffs would have to
prove substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of land to
prevail on a nuisance claim. Interference that did not amount to a
significant interference was not actionable. 24
The court went on to determine whether the interference alleged
by plaintiffs was substantial. It found that
[tihe crux of the plaintiffs' complaint is that publicity concerning the contami-
nation of ground water in the area (although concededly not their ground
water) caused diminution in the value of the plaintiffs' property. This theory
cannot form the basis for recovery because negative publicity resulting in un-
20. Id. at 721.
21. Id. at 719.
22. Id. at 722 (footnotes omitted).
23. Id. at 720.
24. Id. at 723. See also KEETON E AL., supra note 12 (explaining that to state an
actionable nuisance claim, one must allege not just an injury, but a legally cogni-
zable injury).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
founded fear about dangers in the vicinity of the property does not constitute a
significant interference with the use and enjoyment of land.2 5
The court further found that the plaintiffs had not alleged that the
contamination caused them any fear or harm.2 6 Rather, according to
the court, all of the property devaluation allegedly resulted only from
negative publicity. Without any other basis, the court wrote, the pub-
lic response is merely "conjectural, transitory and ephemeral." Conse-
quently, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument.27 Thus, based on
a narrow reading of the allegations of the plaintiffs' complaint, the
majority found that the type of interference alleged in the case was
not substantial.28
At first blush, the Adkins decision seems to set a strong precedent
against the recovery of proximity stigma damages. Yet, the manner in
which the interference was characterized by the majority, together
with the majority's response to arguments raised in the dissent, sug-
gest that the Adkins majority's reasoning should be read to apply to
only a narrow factual situation where no property devaluation can be
traced to any cause beyond negative publicity.
A very vigorous dissent took strong issue with the basis for the
majority's decision. In particular, it took issue with the majority's
finding that "none of the reduction in value was attributable to well-
founded concern about contamination by the defendants of soil and
water supply in the neighborhood."29 The dissent concluded that
[pilaintiffs should, in our opinion, be allowed to recover damages in nuisance
on proofs introduced at a trial tending to show that the defendants actually
contaminated soil and ground water in the neighborhood of plaintiffs' homes
with toxic chemicals and industrial wastes, that the market perception of the
value of plaintiffs' homes was actually adversely affected by the contamina-
tion of the neighborhood, and thus that plaintiffs' loss was causally related to
defendants' conduct.3
0
Pursuant to this reasoning, proof of a causal connection between con-
tamination and property devaluations' would be enough to state a
claim in nuisance.
The majority in Adkins took great pain to distinguish the argu-
ment presented by the dissent. Frequently, the majority character-
25. Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Mich. 1992).
26. Id. at 725.
27. Id. at 724-25.
28. Id. at 723.
29. Id. at 728 (Levin, J., dissenting).
30. Id.
31. Such proof likely would be supplied by, among others, real estate appraisers with
expertise in the assessment of stigma damages. There is substantial literature
on real estate appraisal of stigma damages. See generally sources cited supra
note 2. While this literature primarily is concerned with the proper method of
valuation, some authors do attempt to describe the reasons why nearby contami-
nation may cause property devaluation.
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ized the plaintiffs' claim as an allegation of diminution in property
values based solely on an unfounded fear of injury.32 It also stated
that "on the present state of the record, plaintiffs do not contend that
the condition created by the defendant causes them fear or anxiety."33
The majority even went as far as to surmise why counsel chose to
leave out allegations of personal discomfort or annoyance. The court
clearly indicated that it was reading the allegations of plaintiffs' com-
plaint very narrowly.3 4
Indeed, the majority explicitly excluded the possibility that its de-
cision would apply to a case such as the one characterized by the
dissent.
In a given case, the dangers posed by environmental contamination may not
be adequately addressed by statutorily created private actions or by tradi-
tional rules adopted prior to the existence of these problems. This case does
not present that situation. We do not deal with a situation here in which
plaintiffs have alleged that "the character of the neighborhood has changed for
the worse."3 5
Thus, even the majority suggests that claims in which a neighborhood
has been impacted by contamination or in which plaintiffs experience
personal discomfort or annoyance resulting from such contamination
might be actionable. 3 6
A close reading of the Adkins case suggests that litigants should
not casually rely on the Adkins holding as support for denial of prox-
imity stigma claims. On the one hand, the Adkins majority and dis-
sent, read together, suggest that such a holding is required only in the
narrowest of proximity stigma scenarios. On the other hand, the Ad-
kins court's reasoning actually may be seen as a limited endorsement
of proximity stigma recoveries in cases in which plaintiffs can prove a
nexus between the contamination and their own property's devalua-
tion. At the least the decision suggests that the issue of substantial
32. See Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 721, 725-27 (Mich. 1992).
33. Id. at 725.
34. Id. at 726.
35. Id. at 726-27 (internal citations omitted).
36. The Adkins majority also raises the possibility that courts are not the proper
institution for determining the recoverability of stigma damages. Noting that
many polluters lack the resources to pay for all damages resulting from their
activities, the Adkins majority concluded that allowing proximity stigma claims
may redirect resources away from those who have suffered actual cognizable
harm. The majority suggested that these important considerations should be un-
dertaken by the legislature, not the judiciary. Id. at 727. At least one other court
has suggested that recoverability of stigma damages is not a question for the
judiciary, but would be better suited for legislative determination because of the
complexity and potential impact of the issues raised. See Charles Burton Build-
ers, Inc. v. United States, 768 F. Supp. 160 (D. Md. 1991). See also Roger C.
Cramton & Berry B. Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field: Peril or
Promise, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 407, 412 (1972).
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interference is often an extremely narrow one that must be scruti-
nized carefully in light of the particular facts of each claim.
Despite the detailed historical analysis of the substantial interfer-
ence requirement of the Adkins court and other jurisdictions, 3 7 many
courts have denied proximity stigma cases based on the failure to
prove actual physical harm to one's property.38 These courts apply
state law precedent holding that nuisance recovery requires proof of
physical harm to the plaintiffs property.39 Because the damage in
proximity stigma cases is not based on a physical invasion of, or harm
to, a plaintiffs property, it is highly unlikely that a proximity stigma
claim will succeed in these jurisdictions. Thus, although it seems that
these courts may be applying a legal distinction without proper basis
in the law,40 the existence of such a line of case law in any particular
state will likely result in the denial of proximity stigma damage
claims premised on a theory of nuisance.
The physical invasion requirement has been applied even more
stringently by one federal district court in Lamb v. Martin Marietta
Energy System, Inc.4 1 Pursuant to the reasoning of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, Kentucky law re-
quires not only actual harm, but also that such harm must create a
health risk that rises to the level of substantial interference. The dis-
trict court in Lamb considered a proximity stigma claim brought by
37. See, e.g., Adams v. Star Enter., 851 F. Supp. 770, 773 n.14 (E.D. Va. 1994), affd,
51 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 1995). The Adams court observed that courts that require
physical interference miss the distinction between trespass and trespass on the
case. The former concerns activities that impacted the right to exclusive posses-
sion, while the latter deals with activities that impact a breadth of interests be-
yond just possession, including interference with use and enjoyment.
38. See, e.g., Berry v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 989 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1993); Miller v.
Cudahy, 567 F. Supp. 892 (D. Kan. 1983), affd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 858 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1988).
39. Even the application of the general "physical harm" rule is not without variation.
Some courts hold that a nuisance claim requires proof of physical touching or
invasion. See Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 970
(W.D. Ky. 1993). Others require a showing of some physical harm to property
caused by contamination. See Berry v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 989 F.2d 822, 829
(5th Cir. 1993). While these two standards initially seem to be quite similar,
differences may arise in later interpretations. For example, will courts conclude
that physical harm requires more damage than just a mere physical
encroachment?
40. The Adkins court suggests that the application of the rule requiring physical
touching may be the result of imprecision in defining nuisance historically. Ad-
kins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Mich. 1992). Another source of
confusion in the development of this line of case law may be predicated on a mis-
reading of the general rule that when invasion affects the physical condition of
the plaintiffs land, substantial interference is presumed. See KEnrON ET AL.,
supra note 12. The converse of this rule-that an absence of physical touching
does not result in substantial invasion-is not necessarily the case.
41. 835 F. Supp. 959 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
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plaintiffs who owned property two miles northwest of a uranium pro-
duction plant operated and managed by the defendants.4 2 The plant
began operation in 1951. In August 1988, a plume of contaminants
extending in a northeast direction from the plant was found. Tests
conducted by defendants' consultant showed the plume contained ele-
vated levels of technetium, a radioactive byproduct of nuclear fission,
and trichloroethylene, a solvent regularly used by the plant.43
The defendants began remediation of the contamination shortly af-
ter its discovery. Because of this remediation and testing, which
showed no contamination currently in the plaintiffs' water wells, the
court concluded that it was uncertain whether the contaminant plume
would ever reach the plaintiffs' property.44 Other testing, however,
showed traces of technetium, plutonium 239, trichloroethylene, and
polychlorinated biphenyls in a creek that ran through the plaintiffs'
property and technetium on turnip greens in the plaintiffs' gardens. 45
Thus, although the contaminant plume might never reach the plain-
tiffs' drinking water, apparently contamination from the plant had
managed to physically impact the property through other means.
The plaintiffs based their claim for property damage on a theory of
private nuisance.46 The district court granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment on the nuisance claim. The court used different
legal reasoning to deny plaintiffs' claim regarding the contaminant
plume and actual contamination, respectively. First, it found that no
claim in nuisance could be made for damage resulting from the con-
taminant plume because the plume had not touched the plaintiffs'
property. The court noted that under Kentucky law, nuisance claims
required "physical invasion or a physical 'touching."4 7 Finding no evi-
dence to suggest that the contaminant plume had invaded or touched
the plaintiffs' property, the court found that a nuisance claim could
not be supported by the existence of the plume.4 8
Second, the court held that the actual contamination found on the
plaintiffs' property was not actionable because it posed no health
threat to the plaintiffs. The court first found that the levels of de-
tected contamination did not create a health risk to the plaintiffs.4 9 It
then construed Kentucky law to deny recovery unless the level of ac-
42. Id. at 960.
43. Id. at 960-61.
44. Id. at 961.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 968.
47. Id. at 970 (citing McGinnis v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., No. 91-49, slip op. at 5
(E.D. Ky. July 29, 1992)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 969.
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tual contamination posed a health risk to the plaintiffs.50 Because the
contamination posed no health risk to them, the plaintiffs could not
recover damages in nuisance.5 1 Under the analysis of the District
Court of the Western District of Kentucky, stigma damages might52
be recoverable only in situations in which a property has been actually
contaminated to a level that creates health risks.
In summation, the vast majority of proximity stigma claims have
been based in nuisance law. Courts that have denied these claims
tend to focus on the element of nuisance that requires an interference
with property rights to be substantial. Application of the substantial
interference element in the proximity stigma damage context has
proven somewhat complicated. Many courts apply a rule that requires
physical invasion of a plaintiffs property as a prerequisite to a prox-
imity stigma nuisance recovery. At least one court has extended this
issue, disallowing a nuisance-based stigma claim even when physical
invasion existed but the amount of chemicals did not create a health
risk to the plaintiffs. Other courts do not require physical invasion as
a basis for proving substantial interference. Instead, these courts rec-
ognize that interference can result from aesthetic impacts or the dis-
comfort that arises from living near a contaminated site. None of
these cases, however, would allow for recovery based solely on the
bare allegation that contamination has resulted in property
devaluation.
50. The court found this requirement to be consistent with the significant harm
requirement.
Section 821F of the Restatement states that "there is liability for a nui-
sance only to those to whom it causes significant harm, of a kind that
would be suffered by a normal person in the community or by property in
normal condition and used for a normal purpose." . . . By significant
harm is meant harm of importance, involving more than slight inconven-
ience or petty annoyance. The law does not concern itself with trifles,
and therefore there must be a real and appreciable invasion of the plain-
tiffs interests before he can have an action for either a public or a pri-
vate nuisance.
Id. (internal citation omitted). Thus, the Lamb court found that only an invasion
of property that results in a health risk creates significant interference.
51. Id. The court also determined that claims based only on a perception of nuisance
likewise should not provide a basis of recovery. The court recognized that some
courts allowed recovery for a perception of harm. Id. (citing DeSario v. Indus.
Excess Landfill, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Allen v. Uni-First
Corp., 558 A.2d 961 (Vt. 1988)). Relying cursorily on the reasoning in Adkins,
however, the court determined that such a claim would not be allowed in Ken-
tucky. Id. at 968-69.
52. As mentioned earlier, plaintiffs asserting proximity stigma claims face numerous
obstacles. Even after proving liability, plaintiffs still must prove that the damage
caused by the nuisance is permanent to recover property devaluation under the
general nuisance damages rule. See infra note 95.
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2. Successful Proximity Stigma Claims: Substantial Interference
and Other Factors
While the majority of courts continue to deny claims for proximity
stigma damages, some courts have allowed such claims.5 3 Successful
proximity stigma claims have been decided on a multitude of grounds
and therefore cannot be easily categorized. At least two aspects of
successful proximity stigma claims warrant consideration, however.
First, and perhaps more important, is the recent development of a line
of cases holding that the existence of nearby contamination, which
causes property devaluation without an allegation of any further
harm, amounts to substantial interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of property. Second is the observation that in many successful
proximity stigma claims, property devaluation is tied to a general loss
in community quality of life as a result of contamination.5 4
Perhaps the most significant development in recent stigma juris-
prudence has been the rise of a line of cases allowing recovery of prop-
erty devaluation absent a showing of any actual impact to the
property. Although few courts directly consider the specific elements
of nuisance law in allowing for recovery, those that do suggest that a
general connection between the contamination and diminished prop-
erty values creates substantial interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of property. The recent Ohio decision, DeSario v. Industrial
Excess Landfill, Inc.,5 5 exemplifies this category.
The plaintiffs in DeSario included 1713 individuals who owned
property within two miles of the Industrial Excess Landfill, in Union-
town, Ohio.56 From 1965 to 1980, large quantities of waste had been
deposited in the landfill.5 7 Contaminants found at the site included:
acetone, benzene, hexane, naptha, phenol, xylene, and 1,1,1
53. DeSario v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., No. 89-570 (Ohio Ct. C.P., Stark County
Dec. 6, 1994). See also MHE Assocs. v. United Musical Instruments, USA, Inc.,
No 93CV1882, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5808 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 1995).
54. Generally, the courts in these cases avoid detailed analysis of specific legal causa-
tion requirements in allowing recovery of stigma damages. They hold simply that
production by a preponderance of evidence that ties property devaluation to con-
tamination is enough for a plaintiff to prevail. See Allen v. Uni-First Corp., 558
A-2d 961 (Vt. 1988).
55. See DeSario v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., No. 89-570 (Ohio Ct. C.P., Stark
County Dec. 6, 1994)(lower court opinion).
56. See Hazardous Waste: Property Owners Awarded $6.7 Million in 'Stigma Dam-
ages' from Waste Landfill, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1675 (Jan. 6, 1995)[hereinafter
Hazardous Waste].
57. See DeSario v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 454, 457 (Ohio Ct. App.
1991)(appellate review of the trial court's order certifying the plaintiff class).
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trichloroethane.5 8 In 1980, the landfill was closed pursuant to a con-
sent decree and was later listed on the National Priorities List.59
Plaintiffs brought suit against a number of defendants, including
the landfill's owner and operator and the generators of the hazardous
substances found at the site.60 The plaintiffs claimed that although
their property was not contaminated, stigma prompted by some 600
newspaper articles had reduced property values by $28 million. 61 Al-
ter a full trial, the jury awarded the plaintiffs stigma damages total-
ling $6.7 million. 62
The only basis that can be found for allowing the jury to consider
the plaintiffs' stigma claim is contained in an earlier decision of the
trial court regarding certification of the plaintiff class.6 3 In that deci-
sion, the trial court, without further substantiation, agreed with the
plaintiffs that "in Ohio, to recover damages under a private nuisance
theory, the plaintiffs need not show a physical intrusion onto their
land. The court further agree[d] that a class action may be premised
on the public's perception of contamination irrespective of actual land
contamination." 64 The DeSario court's analysis suggests a two-part
rationale for allowing proximity stigma damages. First, the court
found that physical invasion is not required to satisfy the substantial
interference requirement. It then determined that property devalua-
tion damages resulting from the perception of contamination were re-
coverable. The court thus would allow recovery based on a general
showing of a relationship between the property devaluation and the
contamination.
In considering the appeal of the class certification issue, the Ohio
appellate court gave, at best, implied consent to the trial court's rea-
soning. The appellate court found that even though different plaintiffs
might receive different amounts of damages based on such issues, as
each plaintiffs proximity to the site and amount of time that each
owned his property differed, all of the plaintiffs' claims arose from a
reduction in property value directly related to the presence of the
landfill.65 The appeals court thus suggested that a reduction in prop-
58. See Hazardous Waste, supra note 56, at 1675.
59. The National Priorities List was created as a part of CERCLA. It contains a list
of sites for which cleanup may be paid by the money contained in a fund created
for those purposes.
60. See DeSario v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 454, 457 (Ohio Ct. App.
1991).
61. See Hazardous Waste, supra note 56, at 1675.
62. Id.
63. See DeSario v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 454, 457 (Ohio Ct. App.
1991).
64. Id. at 461 (appendix of appellate court decision containing the decision of trial
court).
65. Id. at 457.
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erty value caused by proximity to a landfill was recoverable. The
DeSario decision has since been buttressed by an Ohio district court
decision denying a motion for summary judgment on a proximity
stigma claim in MHE Associates v. United Musical Instruments, USA,
Inc.6 6 The plaintiff in MHE owned property adjacent to the defend-
ant's musical instrument production facility. The plaintiff alleged
that certain contaminants located on the defendant's property had de-
creased the value of the plaintiffs property. 67
The district court, relying in part on the DeSario decision, elabo-
rated upon the basis for such a claim. The MHE court, like the
DeSario court, first noted that Ohio nuisance law did not require proof
of a physical invasion of property.6 S The MHE court then found that
Ohio law allowed recovery for loss of property value due to a public
perception that property is contaminated.6 9 The district court thus
found that substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of
property may be proven simply by showing a public perception that
property has been contaminated.
MHE and DeSario, in conjunction with the reasoning of the Adkins
minority, provide support for the development of a new line of success-
ful proximity stigma case law. Together, these cases suggest plaintiffs
may be able to prevail on proximity stigma nuisance claims if the re-
viewing jurisdiction does not require a physical touching of land to
support a nuisance claim, and the plaintiff can prove a causal connec-
tion between her property devaluation and the contamination. This
causal connection may be proven simply by a showing of public percep-
tion of contamination. Although still untested in jurisdictions outside
of Ohio, this new line of precedent may result in more proximity
stigma recovery and, almost certainly, in the continued pursuit of
proximity stigma claims based in nuisance law.
The second aspect of successful proximity claims suggests plaintiffs
may be more likely to recover for devaluation in property if they can
tie such devaluation to a general loss in community quality of life
caused by a particular source of contamination. Three decisions exem-
66. See MMIE Assocs. v. United Musical Instruments, USA, Inc., No 93CV1882, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5808 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 1995).
67. Id. at *5.
68. Id. at *8.
69. Id. at *9-10 (citing DeSario v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1991)). The court also found further support for this conclusion in Pros-
ser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, which states that if a "defendant has know-
ingly polluted soil, surface, or underground water and this pollution has affected
to any measurable extent the rental or market value of the plaintiffs land, there
normally would be both substantial and reasonable interference." See id. at *11
(quoting KEEToN ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw oF TORTS § 87, at 627
(5th ed. 1984)). The court's reliance on this statement is questionable. The state-
ment in the treatise appears in the context of a discussion concerning proof of
nuisance when physical interference with land has occurred.
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plify this theory.7 0 For example, Allen v. Uni-First Corp.71 concerned
a claim for damages due to widespread contamination to a town be-
cause of the disposal of chemicals from the defendant's dry cleaning
plant.72 The defendant had disposed wastes containing per-
chloroethylene, a product used in its dry cleaning operation, both on
its own property as well as in the town landfill.73 Moreover, a leak in
the defendant's wastewater discharge system had resulted in a leak of
perchloroethylene into the groundwater. 74 These various sources of
perchloroethylene contaminated the town well and several private
wells. Perchloroethylene also was contaminating the air surrounding
the school located next to the defendant's facility. Finally, evidence
from the plaintiffs' expert suggested that the contamination had infil-
trated the bedrock and deep aquifers below the town.75
The plaintiffs, residents of the town in which the defendant's plant
operated, brought suit in negligence against the defendant. The plain-
tiffs contended that the defendant's operations had resulted in wide-
spread contamination, which in turn had resulted in a diminution in
their property values.76 The plaintiffs further argued that the prob-
lem was exacerbated by media reports of the contamination.
After trial, the jury instructions effectively limited the jury's con-
sideration of the plaintiffs' nuisance claim to the property that was
actually impacted by the perchloroethylene contamination-namely
the school next to the facility and the town wells.77 Having been duly
instructed, the jury determined that although contamination of the
properties existed, such contamination was remediable and did not
70. See Allen v. Uni-First Corp., 558 A.2d 961 (Vt. 1988). See also Arcadian Heritage
Realty, Inc. v. City of Lafayette, 394 So. 2d 855 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Adkins v.
Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 728 (Mich. 1992)(Levin, J., dissenting).
71. 558 A.2d 961 (Vt. 1988).
72. Id. at 962. See also Arcadian Heritage Realty, Inc. v. City of Lafayette, 394 So. 2d
855 (La. Ct. App. 1981)(stating that the siting of landfill in a neighborhood cre-
ates a nuisance "because among other things, the works create unknown environ-
mental effects upon the area; and the works will disrupt the country atmosphere
and aesthetic value of the area"); Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715,
728 (Mich. 1992)(Levin, J., dissenting)(stating that recovery should be allowed if
the plaintiffs prove that the "defendants actually contaminated soil and ground-
water in the neighborhood... [and if] the market perception of the value of plain-
tiffs' homes was actually adversely affected by the contamination of the
neighborhood").
73. Allen v. Uni-First Corp., 558 A.2d 961, 962 (Vt. 1988).
74. Id.
75. Id. Because the extent and migration of the contamination were unknown, it
may be arguable that this case is distinguishable from those cases in which it is
clear that contamination will never reach the plaintiffs' properties. Such a dis-
tinction, however, would fail to consider the burden of proof that would still re-
quire plaintiffs, in cases in which the source and extent of contamination are
unknown, to prove the contamination would impact their property.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 963.
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constitute a continuing nuisance. Because repair cost, not diminution
in value, is the proper measure of damages for temporary nuisances,78
judgment was entered for the defendant.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that by limiting the jury's analysis
only to the properties actually impacted, the trial court erred in not
allowing the jury to consider the overall contamination problem. The
Vermont Supreme Court agreed. Noting that the "plaintiffs' private
nuisance theory was largely dependent upon their ability to establish
a public perception of widespread contamination" and that a causal
connection between such contamination and property value was estab-
lished at trial,79 the court held that the trial court erred in limiting
the jury's consideration of the contamination issue to property actu-
ally contaminated.8 0 Thus, the Vermont Supreme Court explicitly ac-
knowledged that claims for property devaluation, absent a showing of
actual physical harm to any particular property, could be supported by
showing that contamination had a widespread impact on the
neighborhood.
In conclusion, successful nuisance claims can be loosely grouped
into two categories. The first category of cases have dealt somewhat
more explicitly with the legal basis for prevailing on a nuisance-based
stigma claim. These cases suggest that substantial interference can
be established without showing actual impact of contamination on
property. The second category of cases focuses on the connection be-
tween contamination and harm to the community in allowing
recovery.
3. Other Legal Theories: Negligence and Paoli
At least one plaintiff has attempted to base a proximity stigma
claim on a theory of negligence. The claims in Adams v. Star Enter-
prises' stemmed from the spill of more than 100,000 gallons of petro-
leum products at the defendant's tank farm.8 2 The spilled petroleum
leached into the groundwater and formed a plume that extended
under the plaintiffs' property.83 Importantly, although the plume ex-
tended under the property, the "[pilaintiffs [did] not complain of actual
oil odors, ground water contamination, or other material interference
78. See infra note 95.
79. Allen v. Uni-First Corp., 558 A2d 961, 963-64 (Vt. 1988).
80. Id. at 965.
81. See Adams v. Star Enter., 851 F. Supp. 770, 774 (E.D. Va. 1994), affd, 51 F.3d
417 (4th Cir. 1995).
82. Id. at 771.
83. Id. at 772.
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with their properties."84 This led the court to conclude that "as to
plaintiffs' properties at this time there is no contamination."8 5
In light of this conclusion, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to
state a cause of action in negligence because the contamination was
not the proximate cause of their injuries. The court stated that "[t]he
harm complained of, that is the diminution in property values, is a
result of third-party fears about the contamination, not the contami-
nation itself."86 Thus, in situations in which the only source of prop-
erty devaluation pleaded is unfounded third-party fear of
contamination,8 7 the courts have not allowed recovery under a negli-
gence theory.88
Perhaps the better alternate support for proximity stigma damage
claims can be found in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation,8 9 a
decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals that allowed a claim for
postremediation stigma recovery. In so holding, the Third Circuit
found that a plaintiff could base a claim of permanent nuisance9 O on
the stigma that resulted from the prior existence of polychlorinated
biphenyls on a plaintiffs property. The importance of this pos-
tremediation case for proximity stigma plaintiffs is the court's conclu-
sion that fear of harm, unaccompanied by any actual risk of harm, is
recoverable in the tort arena.
The Paoli court specifically was interested in whether the damage
to the plaintiffs' properties was permanent so as to allow for recovery
of property diminution. The Third Circuit found a number of different
ways to conclude that the damage was permanent. Of special impor-
tance to the proximity stigma context was the court's conclusion that
the "stigma associated with the prior presence of PCBs on ... land
84. Id. at 773.
85. Id. Any further basis for this conclusion is not apparent from the decision. Per-
haps this conclusion is better analogized to the decision of the Adkins court,
which held that the plaintiff failed to allege any injury from the contamination.
See Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 728 (Mich. 1992).
86. Adams v. Star Enter., 851 F. Supp. 770, 774 (E.D. Va. 1994), affd, 51 F.3d 417
(4th Cir. 1995).
87. To prevail on a negligence claim, the plaintiffs will have to prove causation in fact
as well as proximate causation. Because proximity stigma contamination by its
nature does not arise from a physical touching of property, such proof is made
more difficult. It will be necessary for plaintiffs to show not just that the contami-
nation has caused them annoyance or discomfort, but also that it is exactly this
annoyance or discomfort that has led third parties to value the property less than
if no contamination existed.
88. Such a result is also likely with any legal theories requiring a showing of proxi-
mate cause, such as strict liability for the creation of an ultrahazardous activity.
89. 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
90. Postremediation cases usually turn on the issue of whether damages are perma-
nent. See infra section H.B.
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constitutes permanent, irremediable damage to property under Penn-
sylvania case law."9 '
To reach this conclusion, the Third Circuit made two findings.
First, it agreed with the plaintiffs' proposition that the diminution in
property value resulting from a fear of physical danger is recoverable
in the tort context.9 2 It then determined that the fear itself was
enough and need not be accompanied by an actual risk of harm to pro-
vide the basis for tort recovery.9 3 Thus, the means by which the Paoli
court construed relevant takings case law provides substantial sup-
port for a claim that property depreciation resulting from unfounded
fears of harm is recoverable in the tort context.94
91. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 796 (3d Cir. 1994). The court also
found damage to be permanent because some increased risk of harm from the
PCBs on the plaintiffs' properties remained and because repair costs alone did
not fully compensate the plaintiffs. For a discussion of these two rationales, see
infra section II.B.
92. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 796 (3d Cir. 1994). The plaintiffs
had argued that a series of takings cases were analogous to the claim at bar.
These cases concerned the valuation of easements taken for the erection of elec-
tric power lines. The issue was whether the property devaluation resulting from
the fear of electromagnetic radiation should be included in the takings valuation.
Courts have responded differently to this issue. Nevertheless, a vast majority of
courts have allowed the stigma associated with electromagnetic radiation to be
included in the valuation in different circumstances.
For a exceptionally informative review of the case law on the issue, see Will-
sey v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 631 P.2d 268 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
93. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717,796 (3d Cir. 1994)(citing Appeal
of Giesler, 622 A.2d 408, 411-12 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993)). The Paoli court relied
on a particular Pennsylvania electromagnetic takings case, Appeal of Giesler, 622
A.2d 408 (Pa. Conmw. Ct. 1993), in reaching this conclusion. The appeals court
analogized Giesler to the issue in Paoli as follows: "The Giesler court assumed
that the electric lines caused no actual physical risk of any sort to plaintiffs' land.
This means that the only ongoing damage to the property in Giesler was the dimi-
nution in value caused by the stigma of living near electric lines." Id. Thus, the
Paoli court determined that diminution in property value resulting from stigma
unaccompanied by physical risk was actionable under Pennsylvania law. Inter-
estingly, the court did not consider those tort cases concerning damages for elec-
tromagnetic radiation, which almost universally have been decided against
plaintiffs. See, e.g., In re TMI Litig. Consol. Proceedings, 927 F. Supp. 834 (M.D.
Penn. 1996).
94. Although recognizing that it was not constrained by its reasoning to do so, the
Paoli court held that plaintiffs must show some actual harm to the property to
recover damages.
[W]e think that at least where (1) defendants have caused some (tempo-
rary) physical damage to plaintiffs' property; (2) plaintiffs demonstrate
that repair of this damage will not restore the value of the property to its
prior level; and (3) plaintiffs show that there is some ongoing risk to
their land, plaintiffs can make out a claim for diminution of value of
their property without showing permanent physical damage to the land.
35 F.3d 717, 796 (3d Cir. 1994). The usefulness of the Paoli courts reasoning
must also be subjected to another caveat. In one footnote, the court relied on the
physical touching requirement elaborated in its test to deal with an amicus' con-
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B. Postremediation Stigma Claims
Claims for postremediation stigma generally have been more suc-
cessful than those for proximity stigma damages. This is primarily
because in postremediation cases, the property has been actually
physically impacted by contamination, thus opening the door to the
assertion of legal claims such as trespass, as well as making it much
easier to succeed on other claims, such as negligence and nuisance.
Although it is much easier for plaintiffs in postremediation cases to
prove liability, plaintiffs still must overcome one legal obstacle to re-
cover damages. Generally, repair costs and special damages, such as
lost rent, are the only damages recoverable for harm to property that
can be repaired. 95 Diminution in property value, on the other hand, is
usually recoverable only when damages are permanent and the prop-
erty cannot be repaired.96 Thus, it is arguable that if property can be
properly remediated, in essence repaired, diminution in property
value should not be recoverable.
In the postremediation context, courts seem much more willing to
avoid damage rules that would foreclose stigma recovery. Thus, pos-
cern that the court's ruling would allow recovery for diminution in value should
an AIDS patient or group home be located near one's property.
We think that these concerns are overstated. The rule we have articu-
lated only allows recovery when there has been some initial physical
damage to plaintiffs land. This rules out recovery in cases such as the
establishment of a group home for the disabled; moreover, recovery in
such cases might well be barred as against public policy.
Id. at 798 n.64 (citation omitted). This reasoning seriously undercuts the court's
construction of Giesler and other electromagnetic radiation cases.
95. Prosser and Keeton set forth the relevant damage rule as follows:
Once a nuisance is established under substantive law, damages are simi-
lar to those in many trespass cases.... If the nuisance, whatever it is,
whether in the form of noxious gases, or noise, or water pollutants, is
permanent, the same measure of damages as in cases of permanent
damages by trespass is normally used-that is, the depreciation in the
market value of the realty by reason of the nuisance. As a rule this will
mean a nuisance that is, in the physical nature of things, unlikely to
abate or to be avoided by any reasonable expenditure of money, though
some states may define permanent nuisances more narrowly....
Where the nuisance, or the injury arising from it, is not permanent
and has been or can be abated, damages are usually measured differ-
ently. The plaintiff usually recovers the depreciation in the rental or use
value of his property during the period in which the nuisance exists, plus
any special damages.... Damages for temporary nuisances are not nec-
essarily limited to depreciated rental values or use values, however.
Where the nuisance is the kind that does more or less tangible harm to
the premises, the cost of repair or restoration may be the appropriate
measure of damages, just as it is the appropriate measure where similar
harm is done in trespass cases.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 89, at 637-39 (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 332-35 (1973)).
96. See id.
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tremediation stigma claims are characterized primarily by the way
courts avoid this problem. Courts have found stigma damages to be
permanent in at least two ways. First, courts may find that some per-
manent damage continues to exist on property even though it has
been remediated. Second, courts turn to precedent suggesting that
when damages for the cost of repair do not make a plaintiff whole,
damages should be supplemented by additional damages for diminu-
tion in property value. In essence, the court read the term "perma-
nent damage" broadly to encompass all damages beyond cost of
repair.97
Both of these theories are embodied in the Third Circuit's decision
in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation.9 8 The Paoli case cen-
tered on what had been described as the highest level of
Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB)99 contamination ever found in an in-
spection by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health.100 PCBs had been used at the yard as a fire-resistant insulat-
ing fluid in railroad car transformers. Over the course of many years,
the PCBs had accumulated in the yard, leached into groundwater, and
contaminated the soil of nearby residences.'Ol In 1986, the United
States brought a CERCLA suit against a number of defendants to
compel the cleanup of the yard. After the entry of numerous consent
decrees, a final plan for cleanup of the railroad yard was adopted in
July 1992.102
Thirty-eight individuals who lived near the yard also sued a vari-
ety of defendants for damages resulting from the contamination. 0 3
Of these thirty-eight individuals, nine sued for diminution in property
value caused by the proximity of the yard to the plaintiffs' property
and the presence of PCBs on their land.104 The district court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the diminution claim.
It found that uncontroverted evidence indicated the railroad yard was
to be adequately remediated, and thus no permanent physical damage
to plaintiffs' properties would result.105 Applying Pennsylvania law,
97. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994); Bixby
Ranch Co. v. Spectrol Elecs., 8 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 955 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1993);
Terra-Products, Inc. v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 653 N.E.2d 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
98. 35 F.3d 717, 796 (3d Cir. 1994). As set forth supra subsection ]II-3, the Paoli
court also found the stigma created by the PCB contamination itself to be a per-
manent source of damages.
99. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 735 (3d Cir. 1994). Later inspec-
tion also uncovered contamination consisting of dibenzo furans and
polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins.
100. Id. at 734-35.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 735.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 795.
105. Id.
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the district court held that repair cost, not diminution in value, was
the proper measure of damages when the harm was "temporary and
remediable."10 6
The Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The ap-
peals court found that diminution in property value should be recover-
able for many reasons. First, it found (1) that the cleanup would not
remove enough of the PCBs from plaintiffs' properties to meet stan-
dard EPA cleanup levels, and (2) that the increased health risk from
remaining PCBs created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the damages were permanent. The court found that under the ap-
proved remediation plan, the EPA itself estimated that the cleanup
would lower cancer risk only to one in 100,000 people, a standard that
is ten times higher than its normal remedial goal of lowering risk to
one in 1,000,000.107 This fact alone, the court held, created a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether a cancer risk of one in 100,000
constitutes actual, permanent damage.1 0 8
The appeals court, however, did not end its analysis at this point.
Instead, it further held that the stigma associated with prior PCB con-
tamination on one's land was a "permanent injury" as that term was
defined under Pennsylvania law.1 0 9 The court pointed to Penn-
sylvania law suggesting that the concept of permanent damages was
intended to apply to all situations in which "repair costs" would, for
some reason, be an inappropriate measure of damages.1 1 0 The court
continued that generally the appropriate measure of damages is de-
fined "as what is necessary to compensate fully the plaintiff."' Be-
cause the plaintiffs would not be made whole without recovering for
property devaluation, the court concluded that diminution in property
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 796. It seems unlikely that the court's reasoning should apply only to situ-
ations in which the cleanup creates a health risk greater than the risk that nor-
mally accompanies a cleanup to a certain level of contamination. That is, any
time a property that has been contaminated is remediated to a level below that of
background levels, an excess risk remains. Pursuant to the reasoning of the
Paoli court, this excess risk should be a permanent source of damage.
109. Id. at 796-97.
110. Id. at 797 (citing Wade v. S.J. Groves & Sons, 424 A.2d 902, 912 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1981)).
111. Id. (citing Wade v. S.J. Groves & Sons, 424 A.2d 902, 911-12 (Pa. Super Ct.
1981)).
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value should be recoverable.112 Thus, many theories support finding
that postremediation stigma damages are permanent.1 ' 3
HI. A PSYCHO-SOCIAL MODEL OF STIGMA
The definition of stigma has been the subject of substantial recent
debate.1 4 The lack of a proper understanding of the phenomenon of
stigma hampers the judicial decisionmaking process and makes it vir-
tually impossible to develop an understanding of the impact of a legal
standard on the policy concerns associated with stigma claims. Thus,
a more complete sense of why contamination events cause property
devaluation is necessary. The purpose of this Part is to discuss the
basis for property devaluation so as to better inform decisionmakers of
the problem. To accomplish this task, this Part inquires into two sep-
arate issues. First, it considers what constitutes stigma. Second, it
considers what factors may influence the size and substance of stigma.
In the process, it notes that current conceptualizations of stigma do
not fully account for stigma as a psycho-social phenomenon resulting
in harm to reputation. Throughout, this Part suggests that legal dis-
cussion of the concept of stigma has itself been based on an incomplete
understanding of the phenomenon.11 5
112. Id. at 797-98. One author has analogized postremediation cases to a developing
trend in case law allowing hybrid recovery of both repair costs and diminution in
value when the repair is incomplete. See Muldowney & Harrison, supra note 2,
at 526, and cases cited therein. This analogy may be applicable to the first basis
for recovery in Paoli, i.e., that remediation is incomplete. The court's second ra-
tionale, however, is slightly different. The second rationale was based on a the-
ory of market failure.
[Wihen physical damage is temporary, only repair costs are recoverable,
because in a perfectly functioning market, fully repaired property will
return to its former value. Thus, an award of repair costs will be fully
compensatory... Hence, normally, it is only when property cannot be
repaired that courts must award damages for diminution in value in or-
der to fully compensate plaintiffs. However, the market sometimes fails
and repair costs are not filly compensatory. In such cases,... plaintiffs
should be compensated for their remaining loss. Absent such an ap-
proach, plaintiffs are permanently deprived of significant value without
any compensation.
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 797-98 (3d Cir. 1994). Pursuant to
this reasoning, even if repairs are complete, recovery should be allowed to correct
for market failure.
113. This reasoning has already played a substantial precedential role in one Indiana
court decision. See Terra Prod., Inc. v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 653 N.E.2d 89, 93
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995)(citing Paoli in holding that postremediation stigma recovery
is allowed when the plaintiff can show that the market value after remediation is
lower than the market value before the contamination was found).
114. See Davis & Longo, supra note 3, at 10345, and citations contained therein.
115. Different judicial decisions have emphasized different aspects of stigma in ana-
lyzing stigma claims. The way in which judicial decisionmaking reflects these
various aspects of stigma will be considered in the margin of this Part, where
appropriate.
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A. The Marking Process
Social psychologists have developed substantial literature on the
phenomenon of stigma. Pursuant to the social-psychological charac-
terization, stigma is defined as a label marking someone (or some-
thing) as deviant.
It is the dramatic essence of the stigmatizing process that a label marking the
deviant status is applied, and this marking process typically has devastating
consequences for emotions, thought, and behavior. Many words have been ap-
plied to the resulting status of the deviant person. He or she is flawed, blem-
ished, discredited, spoiled, or stigmatized....
The mark may or may not be physical: It may be embedded in behavior...
or group membership. It may also be possible to conceal it. The mark is po-
tentially discrediting and commonly becomes so when it is linked through at-
tributional processes to causal dispositions, and these dispositions are seen as
deviant.1 16
This characterization of stigma suggests that stigma arises as a result
of being "marked."1 17 This mark, in turn, is discrediting to the
"marked" party through its link to causal dispositions, such as in-
creased health risk and aesthetic impacts.
It is unnecessary that any of the results attributed to the "mark"
actually occur.1 18 Rather, it is the mark itself that, when noticed,
"changes in a negative and discrediting way how the observer sees the
victim, whose identity is now spoiled," which creates the damage. 119
In other words, the damage caused by stigma is to reputation, 120 or
social standing, and thus arises as soon as the mark attaches. Fur-
ther, "because we tend to assume that people deserve what happens to
them, stigma readily invites a tendency to blame the victim."12 1
Therefore, when property has been marked by contamination, the
psycho-social phenomenon of stigma will result in harm to the prop-
erty's reputation regardless of the potential for harm actually posed
by the underlying contamination.
B. Attributional Harm Versus Actual Harm
It is important to distinguish stigma damage from damage result-
ing from the actual impact of contamination. When a contamination
event occurs, it can result in actual harm to various groups. For ex-
116. EDWARD E. JONES ETAL., SOCIAL STIGMA: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MARKED RELATION-
SHIPS 4-7 (1984).
117. In the context of environmental damage, the mark is one of "contamination." See
EDELSTEIN, supra note 4, at 14 (stating that stigma is a result of being
"contaminated").
118. In any case, once a property is contaminated by any hazardous material above
background level, the actual health risk does increase. See supra notes 94-95.
119. See EDELSTEIN, supra note 4, at 14.
120. Id. at 180.
121. Id. at 14. For a comprehensive exegesis of this phenomenon, see WLLIAM RYAN,
BLAMING THE VICTIM (1976).
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ample, a person who may be exposed to a high level of contamination
may be subject to unreasonable health risks or actual health impacts,
as well as aesthetic impacts, such as odors. Further, contamination
may impact groundwater, rendering it undrinkable, or otherwise im-
pact an individual's ability to use her property. In all of these cases,
the damage is the result of the actual, or the potential for actual, im-
pact of contamination.
Actual damages differ from stigma damages, which are equated
with anticipated outcomes. In both proximity and postremediation
stigma cases, the devaluation in property is tied to perceived out-
comes, not actual ones. 12 2 More specifically, stigma is characterized
as based on the fearL23 that is associated with the mark of "contami-
nation." This fear concerns the same types of harms that are gener-
ally associated with contamination: future cleanup costs that may
result if the government changes its remediation standard; risk to the
health of those on or near the contamination; inconvenience to those
who own or live near the property; aesthetic impacts on those who own
or live near the property; or any number of other impacts contamina-
tion may have. The fear results from attribution of the mark of con-
tamination to its anticipated outcomes, and the fear arises regardless
of whether these anticipated outcomes will actually be realized. Thus,
the potential for actual harm is completely irrelevant to the occur-
rence of stigma.
C. Courtesy Stigma
A property need not be actually contaminated to be marked as
"contaminated." Rather, properties near actually contaminated prop-
erty may become marked indirectly by virtue of a "courtesy stigma,"
whereby the community also becomes stigmatized because of its direct
association with the hazard.12 4 Individuals normally considered with-
out stigma can, by association with the degraded, acquire some of the
socially degrading characteristics of a marked person.12 5 Examples of
122. Many commentators seemingly have confused the attributional harm of stigma
damages with potential actual harm. See, e.g., Davis & Longo, supra note 3, at
10345 ("In other instances stigma is used to refer to a decrease in, or loss of,
property value caused by fear that a property owner may face future cleanup
liability-for example, as a result of a government enforcement action or a third-
party claim."). See also Muldowney & Harrison, supra note 2, at 525 ("An envi-
ronmental stigma results from perception of uncertainty and risk.").
123. See EDELSTEIN, supra note 4, at 14 (stating that stigma is associated with the
phenomenon of anticipatory fear); JoNEs Er A., supra note 116, at 65 (stating
that the essence of stigma is fear).
124. EDELSTEIN, supra note 4, at 180. The concept of courtesy stigma is generally at-
tributed to the noted sociologist Erving Goffman. See ERVING GOFFmAN, STIG IA:
NoTEs ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 30-31 (1963).
125. JoNEs E ., supra note 116, at 71. The reasons for such a phenomenon are
difficult to understand and have not been fully explored. Jones and his col-
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courtesy stigma include the relative of the ex-convict or the friend of a
handicapped individual. These individuals are obliged to share some
of the discredit of the stigmatized person with whom they are associ-
ated.12 6 Further, the relationship need not be of an enduring nature
for courtesy stigma to occur.12 7 Thus, property located near a stigma-
tized property will share in the stigmatization by virtue of its associa-
tion with the stigmatized property.
Indeed, courtesy stigma may have extremely significant impacts in
communities that highly value their particular community image.
Courtesy stigma is inherently tied to image, since image is what is harmed by
stigma. Therefore, a logical inference is that the degree to which stigma is
feared will relate to the extent to which the hazardous facility contradicts the
community image projected. An area seeking to attract tourists because of its
setting, an agricultural area known for its wholesome products, a family resi-
dential area-all are vulnerable to the devaluing of image. 1 2 8
Courtesy stigma may thus have substantial impacts on property val-
ues in communities with reputations tarnished by the
contamination. 129
D. Heuristic Factors that Impact the Degree of Stigma
Perception
Having discussed the way in which stigma develops and affects the
reputation or social perception of property, it is now important to con-
sider a number of variables that impact the substance or size of a par-
ticular stigma. Such factors include the uncertainty surrounding a
contamination event, as well as contextual and cognitive factors that
impact the way individuals perceive both the mark of stigma and the
risks associated with the mark. Consideration of these factors begins
to shed light on the variability of stigma claims and indicates that no
single rule can provide a basis for evaluating stigma harm.
leagues, however, have considered a few potential reasons for the phenomenon.
They suggest, for example, that someone who accompanies a stigmatized person
may be suspected of hiding a similar problem. See GoFFMAN, supra note 124, at
30-31.
126. GOFFMAN, supra note 124, at 30-31. Professor Goffman has noted that the ten-
dency for stigma to spread from the stigmatized person to his close connections
provides a reason why such relations tend either to be avoided or to be termi-
nated. Obviously, the relationship caused by owning property in the same neigh-
borhood as the stigma could be terminated only through the sale of the property.
127. The relationship need not be of an enduring nature for courtesy stigma to occur.
JoNEs Er AL., supra note 116, at 71.
128. See EDELSTEIN, supra note 4, at 180.
129. Such a concern played a large role in the Vermont Supreme Court's decision in
Acadian Heritage Realty, Inc. v. City of Lafayette, 394 So. 2d 855 (La. Ct. App.
1981). For a discussion of both the majority and dissenting opinion, see supra
note 8 and accompanying text.
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A number of factors that may directly affect the perception of
stigma have been identified by researchers.i 30 These factors include
the following:
1. Concealability. Is the condition hidden or obvious? To what extent is its
visibility controllable?
2. Course. What pattern of change over time is usually shown by the condi-
tion? What is its ultimate outcome?
3. Disruptiveness. Does it block or hamper interaction and communication?
4. Aesthetic qualities. To what extent does the mark make the possessor re-
pellent, ugly, or upsetting?
5. Origin. Under what circumstances did the condition originate? Was any-
one responsible for it and what was he or she trying to do?
6. Peril. What kind of danger is posed by the mark and how imminent and
serious is it?
1 3 1
Together, these factors help indicate some of the reasons why the
amount of stigma varies with different environmental contamination
events. A few examples will illustrate this point.
Obviously, the ability to conceal a stigma will significantly affect
its size. Factors that may influence concealability include signs iden-
tifying a site as subject to ongoing cleanup, as well as noxious odors
and noises that may be created by the contamination or its remedia-
tion. As noted by one author, a leaking underground storage tank
cannot be seen, smelled, or felt.i32 In contrast, a landfill subject to a
superfund cleanup is much more readily apparent. In the case of envi-
ronmental contamination, concealability of a stigma may also depend
upon the amount of media coverage given to a contamination event.' 33
Thus, media coverage for an event such as Love Canal134 will likely
play a large role in increased stigma impacts on nearby property,
while the limited coverage received by a small industrial oil or solvent
spill will likely play a smaller role in the creation of stigma.
130. See generally JoNES ET AL., supra note 116, at 24-79 (examining factors that cog-
nitive researchers believe may directly affect the perception of stigma).
131. Id. at 24.
132. See Mundy, supra note 2, at 9.
133. Media coverage may also have other impacts. For example, media coverage is
likely to increase perception of an event as catastrophic or serious and thus im-
pact the anchoring heuristic. See generally infra note 147 and accompanying
text. Because many of these examples impact other factors that affect stigma
perception, it is important to consider each example as if all other factors remain
constant.
134. The story of Love Canal (named after William T. Love) began in 1942, on the
eastern boundary of the city of Niagara Falls, New York, when Hooker Chemicals
and Plastics Corporation started using the canal as a disposal site for manufac-
tured waste. In 1953, the Niagara Board of Education purchased the closed ca-
nal, where an elementary school, and later single-family homes, were
constructed. By 1980, 1000 families lived within 1800 feet of the canal. Chemi-
cals were found in the backyards of the single-family homes in the late 1970s, and
this led to both the EPA and New York State declaring a health emergency in the
area in 1978. The area was subsequently secured from public access.
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Another factor that impacts stigma size is the degree of peril posed
by the contamination. Peril has two dimensions: it considers both the
type of danger posed by an activity and its relative significance.
Either of these factors will likely impact perceptions of stigma. If the
peril posed by a source of contamination impacts the visibility of the
air, but does not impact human health, the stigma associated with the
activity may be minimal. Similarly, if a leaking underground storage
tank is seen as causing an immediate threat to a water supply, it will
result in greater stigma than a leak that does not impact
groundwater.
A number of other context-dependent variables that impact percep-
tion of the underlying risks associated with stigma have also been
identified.135 Some of the more significant of these include the follow-
ing factors: (1) the public's lack of control over an activity;13 6 (2) the
potential of the activity to have catastrophic results; and (3) the ineq-
uitable distribution of risks and benefits.137 Together, these factors
exert a significant influence over the perception of the risks underly-
ing the mark of contamination.
For example, the activity frequently identified as incorporating a
large number of these factors to create significant perceived fear is
nuclear power. While more than 150,000 people die from cigarette
smoking each year, no deaths have resulted from nuclear power.138
Yet until recently, vast resources were spent on controlling nuclear
power and very little on controlling smoking.13 9 This disparity can be
explained through the extremely high-dread risk associated with nu-
clear power. Nuclear risks are "seen as involuntary, delayed, un-
known, uncontrollable, unfamiliar, catastrophic, dreaded and
fatal."140 Thus, although allegedly causing minimal, if any, health ef-
fects, nuclear power is perceived as high-risk due to the confluence of
numerous contextual factors.
135. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 57 (1995).
136. This factor frequently is cast in terms of whether a risk is voluntarily or involun-
tarily assumed.
137. These and other salient factors are identified in Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk,
236 SCIENCE 280, 283 (1987). These factors together provide a significant basis
upon which human perception of risk will vary from expert determination of life
and health impacts of a particular activity. Together, these factors provide the
basis of what Slovic describes as "dread risk."
138. STEPHEN BR=EY, BIEAKNG THE Vicious CIRCLE: TowARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGU-
LATION 6-7 (1993).
139. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 135, at 57-58.
140. CHARLES PERR Ow, NoRMAL ACCmEINTS: LIVING WITH HIGH RISK TECHNOLOGIES
325 (1984)(quoting Paul Slovic et al., Perceived Risk: Psychological Factors and
Social Implications, A376 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SoCIETY OF LONDON 17, 25
(1981)).
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The confluence of a number of these factors may significantly affect
the perception of risks posed by a contamination event. For example,
sources of contamination that are controllable due to the ability to de-
fine and clean the plume of contamination will likely be less stigma-
tizing than those sources in which such activity cannot be undertaken.
Similarly, if one is threatened by a leaking landfill used only for local
waste, the threat will likely be smaller than if the waste was com-
pletely imported because the benefits in the first case are received lo-
cally, while, in the latter case, benefits are received primarily outside
of the community that is impacted.
Cognitive factors also may cause people to either underestimate or
overestimate risks associated with contamination. Recent work in
cognitive psychology suggests that humans do not perceive risk simply
"by identifying what matters to them, comparing probabilities, and
making consistent decisions over time that maximize their overall
utilities."'141 Rather, cognitive psychologists have identified a number
of heuristic' 4 2 processes that impact laypeople's perception of risk.
Such heuristics tend to result in overestimating or underestimating
the actual risks involved in any activity.143
Professor Donald Hornstein has undertaken a survey of heuristic
impacts on risk perception.144 Two examples from that survey will
serve to illustrate the impact of heuristics on perception. The "availa-
141. See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique
of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUm. L. REv. 562 (1992).
142. Cognitive error theorists trace mental distortions of risk to a variety of heuristics
(rules of thumb) and mental "biases" that people tend to use in lieu of expected-
utility-type calculations in approaching risks. See generally Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristic and Biases, in JunG-
MiENT UNDER UNCERTAINY HEURISTIC AND BIASES 3-20 (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982). Tversky and Kahneman have explained that "[blecause of imperfec-
tions of human perception and decision ... changes of perspective, often reverse
the relative apparent size of objects and the relative desirability of options."
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychol-
ogy of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981). For example,
if while traveling in a mountain range you notice that the apparent rela-
tive height of mountain peaks varies with your vantage point, you will
conclude that some impression of relative height must be erroneous,
even when you have no access to the correct answer. Similarly, one may
discover that the relative attractiveness of options varies when the same
problem is framed in different ways .... The susceptibility to perspec-
tive effects is of special concern in the domain of decision-making be-
cause of the absence of objective standards such as the true height of the
mountains.
Id at 457. For another description of heuristics, see generally Marina Groner et
al., Approaches to Heuristics: A Historical Review, in METHOD OF HEURISTICs 13-
14 (Rudolf Groner et al. eds., 1983).




bility heuristic" describes the tendency of people to weigh the
probability of an event by the ease with which some relevant informa-
tion comes to mind; other information, although relevant, is ignored
simply because it does not come to mind so quickly.' 4 5 Such a heuris-
tic may result in either overestimation or underestimation of risk
based on context. For example, the public may overestimate risk be-
cause of the occurrence of sensational, but statistically unlikely mis-
haps, such as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. Similarly, the public
may underestimate the risk of high fat diets because the impacts are
diffuse and less sensational.14 6
Another heuristic that may impact perception is the "anchoring
heuristic." The anchoring heuristic tends to exacerbate the effects of
other heuristic devices. Anchoring is a process whereby a person, af-
ter learning that he has based his probability estimates on improper
information, continues to be influenced by these assessments.' 4 7 For
example, a homeowner who learns that his neighbor's property is con-
taminated may continue to believe that his property is also contami-
nated even though testing has revealed the opposite.14 8 These types
of heuristic devices will result in a property owner and potential
buyer's overestimation or underestimation of the risks posed by con-
tamination and thus the size of the stigma associated with a contami-
nation event.
In summation, stigma is the result of being marked either physi-
cally or through a process called courtesy stigma. The result of being
marked is a loss in social standing and injury to reputation. Once a
property has been marked, the size of a stigma may differ based on a
number of different factors. In particular, a number of context-based
factors tend to influence the size of the "mark," and other factors im-
pact perception of the risks posed by the contamination event. This
suggests that, if aligned properly, these factors can actually result in
perceived risks that are much higher or smaller than the amount of
risk determined by experts to accompany any contamination event.14 9
145. Id. at 606 (citing Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under Informational
Asymmetry: The Effect of Framing on Logical Rules, 38 UCLA L. REV. 391, 394
(1990); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heu-
ristic and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINY: HEURISTIc AND BIASES 3, 11
(Daniel Kabneman et al. eds., 1982)).
146. See Hornstein, supra note 141, at 608 (citing MARGARET MAXEY, MANAGING ENVI-
RONMENTAL RisKs: WHAT DIFFERENCE DoEs ETHics MAKE 7-8 (1990)).
147. See Hornstein, supra note 141, at 609 (citing Clayton P. Gillette & James E.
Krier, Risk, Courts and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027, 1092 (1990)).
148. See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts and Agencies, 138 U. PA.
L. REV. 1027, 1092 (1990).
149. The inquiry into the causes of property devaluation does not, however, end with a
consideration of stigma. Indeed, many other factors influence property values
once a source of contamination is known. For example, the discovery of contami-
nation may impact an individual's sense of control over his community or create a
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IV. ANALYSIS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE PSYCHO-SOCIAL
MODEL FOR STIGMA JURISPRUDENCE
To this point, this Article has provided an understanding of the
dynamic that causes stigma damage and the way in which courts have
acted upon that dynamic when confronted with claims based almost
exclusively in nuisance law. This Part analyzes the adequacy of the
current jurisprudential treatment of stigma damages in light of this
understanding. It argues that current nuisance-based jurisprudence
generally is not well-suited to the disposition of stigma claims. First,
this Part argues that judicial focus on the substantial interference test
is seriously misplaced. Put simply, the purpose of the substantial in-
terference test is to ensure that nontrespassory invasions cause harm
of a type that would be suffered by a normal person in the community.
Because stigma devaluation is the type of harm that would be suffered
by a normal community member,150 the substantial interference test
will always be satisfied. Second, this Part notes that the majority in-
terpretation of substantial interference, which requires proof of some
actual impact to property before allowing stigma damage recovery,
creates a basis for the award of stigma damages that advances no
valid policy concern. Instead of focusing on substantial interference,
this Part argues that when confronted with a nuisance claim, courts
should, when possible, focus their attention on the element of nui-
sance that requires an invasion to be unreasonable. While this change
in focus does not solve all problems associated with stigma claims, as a
standard it is much more suitable to achieving proper results.
Although virtually all claims for stigma damages have been pre-
mised on a theory of nuisance,15 1 this section further argues that once
loss of trust for those experts and officials entrusted with community well-being.
These factors generally have been identified by Professor Michael Edelstein as
providing a psycho-social basis for the NIMBY ("Not in My Backyard") response
to potentially hazardous activity in a community. See EDEISTEIN, supra note 4,
at 180-81. Edelstein suggests these factors influence individuals to take vigilant
action to oppose locating a hazardous activity within their neighborhood. He does
not suggest that they may also provide a basis for property devaluation once a
contamination event has occurred. It is unlikely that any of these factors play a
significant role in the devaluation of property attributable to third-party percep-
tion of value, and thus they will not be discussed further in this Article.
150. Indeed, as is argued later, one of the major distinctions between stigma damages
and other types of nonphysical damage is that stigma can be proven through an
objective analysis of property values without regard to the subjectiveness of the
property owner. See infra note 189.
151. The reasons for this phenomenon are not entirely clear. For proximity stigma
claims, nuisance may have been perceived as a better basis for recovery because
it generally does not require a physical invasion of property. Lawyers also may
have turned to nuisance because of their fear of the treatment their claims would
be given under negligence law. In particular, a number ofjurisdictions consider-
ing related claims of fear of disease have found such claims to be recoverable only
with proof of a number of particular factors not generally provable by stigma
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the mechanism by which stigma is created can be understood, negli-
gence becomes a better vehicle for the assertion and consideration of
stigma claims. This Part shows how the problems associated with a
nuisance standard do not arise with the application of negligence law,
and how negligence will force those who deal with stigma to confront
head on its causes and potential impacts. Finally, this Part discusses
the importance of proving damages in the stigma context. This Part
refers to the earlier discussion of the causes of stigma and suggests
that the majority of stigma harm is likely to be temporary. A focused
analysis of the stigma and its sources will serve to ensure that only
those plaintiffs who prove that they have been permanently harmed
by a stigma will be allowed to recover.
A. Problems with the Substantial Interference Standard:
The Difference Between Actual and Psychological
Harm and Why Roses Are Not a Nuisance
There is strong legal support for the argument that property deval-
uation resulting from a contamination event results in substantial in-
terference with the use and enjoyment of properties. But, tying
recovery to whether property has been actually impacted by contami-
nation creates a completely arbitrary standard. Moreover, the argu-
ments advanced by courts for allowing recovery only in cases of actual
impact are misplaced. In particular, the concern that finding property
devaluation alone creates substantial interference will open the door
to nuisance claims against bare uses such as group homes is un-
founded. In most situations, reliance on the element of nuisance law
that requires a showing of tortious conduct or unreasonable interfer-
ence will work to satisfy these judicial concerns. Courts should con-
sider relying on the substantial interference standard only in states
with laws that do not require a showing of tortious conduct or unrea-
sonable interference and thus raise the possibility that a bare use
such as a group home may be held to create a nuisance.
In most cases, stigma damages satisfy the substantial interference
test. The purpose of the substantial interference test is not to test the
means by which an invasion occurs, but to ensure that a nontrespas-
sory invasion of land that fails to cause harm will not result in a nui-
sance recovery. Yet, once an invasion of property creates harm, it
generally will be considered substantial. Prosser and Keeton have de-
scribed this requirement based on its relationship to trespass:
Any intentional and unprivileged entry on land is a trespass without a show-
ing of damage, since those who own land have an exclusive right to its use; but
an act that interferes with use but is not in itself a use is not actionable with-
plaintiffs. As will be discussed, it is questionable whether the concerns underly-
ing these negligence standards will require application of such standards in the
stigma damage context. See infra note 183.
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out damage. The substantial interference requirement is to satisfy the need
for a showing that the land is reduced in value because of the defendant's
conduct. 1 5
2
Simply put, an activity that results in a physical invasion of land
without harm is actionable. An activity that objectively interferes
with the use of land, including interfering with the ability to dispose of
land, is actionable, however, only if it causes harm. For example, the
odors from a neighbor's rose garden may interfere with one's use and
enjoyment of land (if the property owner does not enjoy the smell of
roses), but if the smell of roses does not reduce the value of the prop-
erty, the rose garden will not be found to create a nuisance.153
Stigma-based devaluation satisfies these concerns. Stigma-based de-
valuation is an interference with the use and enjoyment of property15 4
that results in damage to the property. In other words, the devalua-
tion to the property is a direct result of the defendant's conduct.15 5
Second, the current majority rule in nuisance jurisprudence pro-
vides an artificial, if not totally arbitrary, basis for the award of
stigma damages. The vast majority of nuisance cases turn on whether
there has been a substantial interference with the use and enjoyment
of the plaintiffs property.156 Further, substantial interference gener-
ally is interpreted to require proof of either some physical invasion of
property157 or some actual impact, such as aesthetic impact, on the
use and enjoyment of land.158 Together these standards will be re-
ferred to as "actual impact" standards. The actual impact standards,
however, advance no valid policy concern. Indeed, at best these stan-
dards can be seen as creating artificial distinctions upon which to
award damages for stigma-based harms.
152. KEETON ET AL.., supra note 12, § 87, at 623.
153. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 821F (1987). "There is liability for a
nuisance only to those to whom it causes significant harm, of a kind that would be
suffered by a normal person in the community or by property in normal condition
and used for a normal purpose." Id.
154. Use and enjoyment is defined very broadly to include all interests in use and
enjoyment of property, including the pleasure, comfort, and enjoyment that a per-
son normally derives from the occupancy of land. Further, "freedom from discom-
fort and annoyance while using land is often as important to a person as...
freedom from detrimental change in the physical condition of land itself." Id.
§ 821D cmt. b. The right to freedom from discomfort includes "the right to be free
from physical pain, annoyance, stress,... and the right to dispose of land." Rois-
man & Mason, supra note 10, at 10071 (citing Long v. City of Charlotte, 293
S.E.2d 101, 110 (N.C. 1982); Hanna v. Brady, 327 S.E.2d 22, 25 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985)).
155. For an exposition of the argument that stigma devaluation satisfies the substan-
tial interference test, see Roisman & Mason, supra note 10.
156. See supra section U.B. It is assumed that in the case of postremediation nuisance
claims, liability is proven and damages become the court's focus because actual
impact has occurred. See supra note 95.
157. See supra section I.B.
158. See, e.g., supra note 154.
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The actual impact standards bear no relationship to whether a
party has actually been harmed by virtue of stigma. Stigma devalua-
tion is the result of anticipatory fears attributed to a particular
mark.1 5 9 The mark can be caused by actual contamination or through
association resulting in marking by courtesy.1 60 The harm caused by
this process bears little relation to a harm based on the actual impacts
of contamination-one is a harm based on attributional fear, while the
other is a harm based on the potential that certain activities may oc-
cur in the future.1 6 i
The lack of correlation can be best explained through an example.
Assume that a plaintiffs property has been permanently devalued by
ten percent of its actual market price due to a contamination event.
Assume further either that the property has been impacted by the
contamination at low levels or that those living on the property have
been impacted aesthetically or by odors relating to the event. The ac-
tual harm that is the cost associated with the potential (1) that the
contamination will result in money being expended for cleanup,1 6 2 (2)
that contamination will impact health, or (3) that contamination will
aesthetically or otherwise impact use of property, will be extremely
limited. The majority of the harm, regardless of the actual impact,
will still flow from attributional fear.
An appraiser has related a story of one contamination event, which
helps to put this understanding in perspective.
For example, in the 1990 sale of an industrial property formerly owned by a
Fortune 500 company, serious soil contamination had been discovered in
1983. The large corporate owner signed a consent order and the cleanup was
begun. Seven years later, the local environmental protection agency consid-
ered the cleanup complete. It is important to note that if any future cleanup
were deemed necessary the corporate owner would be held responsible for
such costs. Another Fortune 500 company was an intermediate holder of title
in this property and stood second in line to pay for cleanup costs if the first
owner failed to pay for any reason. Consequently, liability for present and
future cleanup costs simply was not an issue in the sale of this property. Any
discount from its unimpaired value would thus be attributable strictly to the
stigma factor. Several local appraisers and the assessor agreed that the
unimpaired value of the property was about $2,000,000. After an 8-month
sales effort, the property was sold for $95,000 cash. The indicated discount,
caused solely by the effect of stigma, was over 95%.163
159. See Hornstein, supra note 141.
160. Id.
161. For a complete analysis of the difference between these two types of harm, see
supra section IH.B.
162. For example, future cleanup costs may be associated with the possibility that in
the future, individuals become newly aware of the potential dangers of a particu-
lar substance or of a lower threshold exposure. See Terry J. Tondro, Reclaiming
Brownfields to Save Greenfields: Shifting the Environmental Risks of Acquiring
and Reusing Contaminated Land, 27 CoNN. L. Rxv. 789 (1995).
163. See Patchin, Contaminated Properties-Stigma Revisited, supra note 2, at 167-
68.
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The true arbitrariness of the actual harm standard becomes even
more apparent when comparing the plaintiff whose property has been
actually impacted and can recover stigma damages with the party
whose property has not been actually impacted. Even though a signif-
icant portion of their harm is caused by the same source and event,
one party will be allowed to recover while the other party will not. In
short, correlating actual impact with stigma damage creates irrational
results.
Take, for example, the case of Allen v. Uni-First Corp.164 In this
case it was shown that the disposal of perchloroethylene from the de-
fendant's dry cleaning plant had resulted in widespread contamina-
tion to an entire community.165 Although the court did not explicitly
address this factor, it is reasonable to assume that a large number of
individual properties were not actually impacted by the contamina-
tion. Although the devaluation to these properties is likely to be as
severe as the devaluation on actually impacted properties, only those
parties whose properties have been actually impacted by the contami-
nation would be allowed to recover their stigma damages in most
cases.
B. Misplaced Need for Actual Impact
Courts have raised two reasons for relying on an actual impact
standard. Neither reason provides a satisfactory basis for such reli-
ance in all circumstances. Some courts base their decision to use an
actual impact standard on the assertion that without any potential for
actual impact to property, the fears associated with a contamination
event are unfounded.' 6 6 This argument does not, however, provide a
basis for drawing the line at actual impact. 16 7 As just explained, the
vast majority of situations in which property values decrease, even
with actual impact, are still attributable to the same psycho-social
forces that result in devaluation of property that could not be actually
impacted.36s Indeed, when the actual impact is aesthetic in nature, it
164. 558 A-2d 961 (Vt. 1988).
165. Id.
166. See Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 969 (W.D. Ky.
1993).
167. A separate and more basic question concerns whether attributional harm should
be recoverable at all. In other words, because stigma is a harm based on fears of
results that cannot occur, one may question allowing stigma damages in any par-
ticular situation at all. Responses to this concern are numerous. First, it may be
argued that stigma damages are the result of the way in which reasonable people
think. Moreover, if these damages are not the result of the way in which reason-
able people think, as one court has stated, they are caused by market failure and
should be recoverable in any case. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d
717, 795 (3d Cir. 1994).
168. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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is possible that virtually the entire amount of devaluation is attributa-
ble to attributional fear. Nevertheless, courts do not limit an award of
damages to that portion of property devaluation associated with the
factual impacts of contamination and not the portion associated with
such a psycho-social response.16 9 Rather, the actual impact standard
allows recovery of a substantial portion of the devaluation solely at-
tributable to these "nonrational" responses. The actual impact stan-
dard does not, therefore, prevent the concerns expressed by the courts
regarding unfounded harm.
A second concern advanced by courts that have opted for the actual
impact standard is that tying nuisance recovery to actual invasion cre-
ates a standard that would not allow recovery of stigma damages sim-
ply because a neighboring use, say to a group home, incites
anticipatory fear that results in property devaluation.170 Courts gen-
erally have indicated an unwillingness to attach stigma damage to
this type of property use.17 1
This problem arises, however, only to the extent that nuisance al-
lows recovery for a use of property without fault. Broadly speaking,
nuisance may be applied to another's use of property that causes
problems with the use and enjoyment of one's own property.172 Be-
yond this basic concept, state definitions of nuisance differ substan-
tially17 3 and, perhaps based on historical treatment of nuisance, 174
169. For example, one could determine the likelihood that more stringent standards
will be created and multiply this by the cost such a standard would require from
the party that is actually responsible. This number, of course, will have to be
discounted by the possibility that one may be able to recover these costs from the
party that is actually responsible.
170. See Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 969 (W.D. Ky.
1993).
171. One exception to this rule is the doctrine of absolute nuisance. For a general
analysis of the relationship between nuisance and strict liability theories, see Jon
G. Anderson, Comment, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine in America: Abnor-
mally Dangerous, Ultrahazardous, or Absolute Nuisance?, 1978 Arz ST. L.J. 99,
106-08.
172. See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 314 (3d Cir. 1985)(ex-
plaining that the historical role of private nuisance law is a means of resolving
conflict between neighboring, contemporaneous uses).
173. Indeed, probably no other cause of action is treated as differently by the states as
nuisance.
There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than
that which surrounds the word 'nuisance'. It has meant all things to all
people, and has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an
alarming advertisement to a cockroach in a baked pie. There is general
agreement that it is incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition.
KEEToN Er AL., supra note 12, § 86, at 616.
174. While early cases of private nuisance seem to have assumed that a defendant was
strictly liable and thus made no inquiry as to the nature of his conduct, the trend
has been to require a level of tortious conduct by the defendant for nuisance re-
covery. Id. § 87, at 624.
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many courts have treated nuisance as based on a standard of strict
liability.
Not surprisingly, different jurisdictions have developed varied, and often con-
tradictory, rules of pleading, proof, and permissible defenses under the gen-
eral heading of nuisance. In the environmental tort context, this situation can
result in similar conduct--or similar industrial activity-being treated under
radically different rules of law at different times and in different jurisdictions.
Thus, for example,... the Texas Court of Civil Appeals ruled that liability in
private nuisance for oil seepage from an underground pipeline may be estab-
lished only by proving that the pipeline operators acted negligently.1 75 In
contrast, in 1983, a New Jersey Superior Court ruled... that owners of a
gasoline storage facility should be held strictly liable to adjoining property
owners for damage caused by a crude oil leak.1 76
Even under the Restatement definition, there is substantial varia-
tion in the fault standards applicable to nuisance. The type of conduct
that may be actionable as a nuisance is codified in the Restatement.
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a
legal cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoy-
ment of land, and the invasion is either
(a) intentional and unreasonable, or
(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling li-
ability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous
conditions or activities.1 77
Thus, in many jurisdictions nuisance will be recoverable for conduct
that is intentional, negligent, reckless, or that creates an abnormally
dangerous condition. In any of these situations, it would seem impos-
sible to attach nuisance liability to the use of a group home simply
because the use resulted in property devaluation.
Nonetheless, construction of the intent requirement of nuisance
has, as a practical matter, created a quasi-strict liability standard.
The Restatement defines intent broadly. "An invasion of another's in-
terest in the use and enjoyment of land ... is intentional if the actor
(a) acts for the purpose of causing it, or (b) knows that it is resulting or
is substantially certain to result from his conduct."17 8
As a practical matter this construction of intent permits nuisance actions to be
grounded in conduct that is neither negligent nor specifically directed toward
the creation of a nuisance. Where an industrial facility has been operated
non-negligently, a court may infer the requisite element of intent if the de-
fendant continues to operate with knowledge that damage to neighboring
property owners is occurring. 179
175. Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Anderson, 339 S.W.2d 259,264-65 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
176. 3 SusAN M. CooK, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP,
LiABmrrY, AND LITIGATION § 17.01[2][b], at 17-19 to 17-20 (1994).
177. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTS § 822 (1987).
178. Id. § 825.
179. 3 COOKE, supra note 176, at 17-21. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs
§ 825 cmt. d (1987)(stating that "when the conduct is continued after the actor
knows that the invasion is resulting from it, further invasions are intentional").
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Under this interpretation, virtually all nuisance laws leave open the
possibility that a "group home," without more, may be considered the
source of a nuisance. Simply put, if the condition causing the invasion
is a "group home," then a standard that does not require proof of ac-
tual impact may result in liability for the use without a need to show
more, and the only way to stop the impact once knowledge is received
would be to stop the use. Courts do not want to open the door to such
a result.
This judicial concern, however, misses the important fact that
under the Restatement, intentional conduct alone does not satisfy
most states' nuisance requirements. Rather, the definition requires a
plaintiff to prove that such interference is intentional and unreasona-
ble.18o The unreasonableness requirement will serve to ensure that
the feared result does not occur. The Restatement sets forth the fol-
lowing test for unreasonable interference:
An intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land
is unreasonable if
(a) the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct, or
(b) the harm caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of
compensating for this and similar harm to others would not make the continu-
ation of the conduct not feasible. 1 8 1
This balancing test serves to draw the line desired by courts.
180. See REsTATImENT (SEcoN-D) OF TORTS § 822 (1987). The Restatement requires
proof of substantial and unreasonable or otherwise tortious interference.
181. Id. § 826. Further definitions of gravity of harm and utility of conduct are pro-
vided by the Restatement in sections 827 and 828.
Section 827 sets forth criteria to be considered in determining the gravity of
harm.
In determining the gravity of the harm from an intentional invasion
of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land, the following fac-
tors are important:
a) the extent of the harm involved;
b) the character of the harm involved;
c) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use and enjoy-
ment invaded;
d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the
character of the locality; and
e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.
Id. § 827.
Section 828 sets the criteria to be used in determining the utility of an
activity.
In determining the utility of conduct that causes an intentional inva-
sion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land, the following
factors are important:
a) the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the
conduct;
b) the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality; and
c) the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion.
Id. § 828.
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Without methodically analyzing each element of the test, it is pos-
sible to argue generally that a facility that handles hazardous sub-
stances is less suited to a residential neighborhood (the neighborhood
in which stigma will most significantly harm reputation) than a group
home, and that the harm from a contamination event may be practica-
bly prevented short of shutting down the facility, which would be the
likely result with a group home.18 2 Thus, by focusing on these equita-
ble concepts, courts, in general, may be able to ensure that only those
activities that can be controlled and are not from uses that are not
well suited to a particular location will be liable for stigma damages.
While the standard may not award damages based purely on whether
the contamination event has created a stigma,1S3 it achieves the goal
set forth by courts in a manner better adapted to analysis of stigma
harm.
This Article has explained how current majority nuisance liability
standards do not relate to the mechanisms by which stigma occurs,
and thus, these standards create arbitrary results. In addition, this
Article has set forth how arguments for adopting such actual impact
standards are frequently misplaced. Only in situations in which state
nuisance law prescribes recovery based on strict liability, without an
unreasonable interference requirement, should courts consider an ac-
tual impact standard. In most cases, however, a finding that stigma
devaluation creates substantial interference will not engender the
feared results. Moreover, the requirement that an interference be un-
reasonable, or based on otherwise tortious conduct, will be generally
better suited to analysis of stigma claims.
C. Applying a Negligence Standard: The Difference
Between Emotional Harm and Stigma
As this discussion of nuisance law suggests, a standard that deals
with claims for stigma devaluation should consider both the act that
creates the stigma as well as the means by which the act causes
stigma harm. Based on these concerns, a negligence standard is bet-
ter suited to an analysis of stigma harm than nuisance. Negligence
jurisprudence does not create artificial distinctions based on fears of
engendering unwanted results. This makes it a more realistic choice
182. See Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 969 (W.D. Ky.
1993).
183. This standard still does not require parties to confront head on those aspects of
stigma damages that create harm. Thus, it is unlikely that the standard will be a
preferable means of analyzing stigma harm as negligence. See Chalmers &
Roehr, supra note 2; Mundy, supra note 2; Patchin, Contaminated Properties-
Stigma Revisited, supra note 2; Patchin, Valuation of Contaminated Properties,
supra note 2. See also Davis & Longo, supra note 3; Roisman & Mason, supra
note 10.
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for analysis of stigma claims. Perhaps more important, negligence,
with its direct analysis of causation, serves to focus the inquiry onto
the actual dynamic by which stigma damages occur.
The greatest obstacle to assertion of a negligence-based stigma
claim is the unsympathetic analysis given by courts to claims brought
by individuals exposed to contamination for emotional harm resulting
from the fear of disease. Courts traditionally have set high standards
for recovery of this type of emotional harm. The majority of courts
require actual impact or injury for the recovery of emotional harm,
unless the activity causing the harm was undertaken intentionally.184
Courts also require that the fear of illness be reasonable before al-
lowing recovery.1 8 5
Courts do not base these high standards on the belief that serious
emotional harm cannot result from a defendant's activity. Rather, the
reasons for such strict standards generally are based on the highly
subjective nature of emotional distress and the difficulty in determin-
ing its genuineness.' 8 6 Courts fear that the intangible nature of dam-
ages and potential for an unrestricted class of plaintiffs would
overburden the judicial process, and that courts would face negligent
defendants with a plethora of unrealistic claims.1S7
None of the factors of concern in emotional harm cases are present
in the case of stigma damages. Stigma damages are not based on the
fears of plaintiffs. Rather, stigma damages are based on the fears of
third-party purchasers who do not stand to benefit in any way from
the claims against the defendant.1 8 8 Moreover, stigma harm is em-
bodied in a decrease in property value, which is measurable through
empirical appraisal techniques.18 9 In short, while courts have not
184. See, e.g., Nesom v. TriHawk Intl, 985 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1993); Moore v. Allied
Chem. Corp., 480 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Va. 1979).
185. See, e.g., In re Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634 (D. Me. 1986).
186. See KEnTON Er AL., supra note 12, § 54, at 361, 363.
187. The various concerns were reviewed by the California Supreme Court in Potter v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993), which considered the fol-
lowing factors: (1) the tremendous societal cost of allowing emotional distress
compensation to a potentially unrestricted plaintiff class; (2) the unduly detri-
mental impact that unrestricted fear of liability would have on the health care
field; (3) allowing recovery to all victims who have a fear of cancer may work to
the detriment of those who sustain actual injury and those who ultimately de-
velop cancer as a result of the toxic exposure; (4) establishing a definite and pre-
dictable threshold of recovery to permit consistent application from case to case;
and (5) restricting liability of negligent tortfeasors for emotional loss in consider-
ation of the intangible nature of the loss, the inadequacy of monetary damages to
make whole the loss, the difficulty of measuring the damage, and the societal cost
of attempting to compensate the plaintiff. Id.
188. Purchaser incentives will be further explored later in this section's discussion of
damages rules.
189. For an analysis of the appraisal techniques available to access stigma damages,
see Chalmers & Roehr, supra note 2; Mundy, supra note 2; Patchin, Contami-
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doubted the validity of many cases of emotional harm, the need to re-
strict claims for such harm was based on the impact the subjective
nature of the harm would have on the litigation process. These con-
cerns are not implicated in the case of objectively measurable stigma
harm.
The use of a negligence standard would provide a much better
means by which to consider stigma claims. First, negligence requires
parties to focus directly on the specific act that allegedly causes prop-
erty devaluation. It does this through the simple process of requiring
proof that a party has acted unreasonably toward another. This pro-
cess stands in direct contrast to nuisance law, which may allow action
against those who maintain a condition that causes the nuisance.' 9 0
Take, for purposes of comparison, the group home example previously
considered in this Article. While a nuisance standard based on strict
liability will allow damages for any broadly defined "use" of the prop-
erty, negligence will allow recovery only if the home is operated unrea-
sonably. The simple existence of a group home in the neighborhood
will not provide a basis for stigma recovery.
The proximate causation requirement will further ensure that only
the stigma resulting from an improperly run activity will be recover-
able. In proving causation, plaintiffs will have to show that the spe-
cific contamination event-that is, the negligent act-and not the use
of property in general, was the source of a decrease in property values.
Such proof would have many levels. First, plaintiffs would have to
consider using expert testimony to offer proof of the dynamic by which
stigma is caused.19' Evidence of permanent stigma harm would be
introduced through the testimony of an appraiser.192 Appraisal evi-
dence could then be supplemented by evidence that the various factors
impacting the creation and size of stigma have been implicated. For
example, testimony may show the event received wide news coverage.
Similarly, evidence could be presented on the controllability of an ac-
tivity and the possibility that the activity may cause catastrophic
results.19 3
Thus, a negligence standard solves the major problems of the cur-
rent nuisance liability scheme. A negligence standard does not create
nated Properties-Stigma Revisited, supra note 2; Patchin, Valuation of Contam-
inated Properties, supra note 2. See also Davis & Longo, supra note 3; Roisman &
Mason, supra note 10 (suggesting the use of objective analysis).
190. See supra note 174.
191. Expert testimony is frequently used to prove causation. KEaTON ET AL.., supra
note 12, § 41, at 269. In this case, it may be necessary to provide evidence on the
cause of stigma through the testimony of either a psychologist or sociologist.
192. For an overview of general appraisal techniques, see texts cited supra note 189.
193. See supra note 189 and accompanying text generally for these factors. These fac-
tors will also play a role in analyzing the permanence of a stigma. See infra note
199.
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an artificial distinction for stigma damage awards. Further, a negli-
gence standard will ensure that activities that are properly run and
constructed will not become a source of stigma damages.' 94 Similarly,
the use of a negligence standard will ensure that only the devaluation
resulting from the actual malfeasance is recovered.
The negligence damage standard also satisfies major policy con-
cerns.1 9 5 Two major concerns impact the award of stigma damages.
First, an analysis of many of the factors that impact the potential and
size of stigma suggests that stigma damage will decrease over time
and that many stigmas may be only temporary. For example, one
heuristic device described earlier, the anchoring heuristic, 9 6 explains
that individuals will not immediately change their beliefs upon ac-
quiring new information. Understanding will change in time after
new information is learned. This has led commentators to suggest
that regulators of an activity should "strike while the iron is cold" to
ensure that standards reflect all information. 19 7 Similarly, appraisers
have noted that stigma frequently decreases substantially after infor-
mation on the nature and extent of contamination is developed. 198
The most important factors to consider in determining whether a
stigma will be permanent are the factors that play a role in the mark-
ing of property. In particular, over time the mark may become incon-
spicuous. Consequently, this information should play an important
role in the determination of whether a stigma will be permanent.
Over time a contamination event will likely be remediated, news sto-
ries of the event no longer will be published, and other discernable
indicia will also dissipate. Thus, although it is possible that a contam-
ination event may endure much longer at a community level than at a
state or national level, it is also very likely that the stigma associated
with any event may be temporary, and proof of this may itself be the
most difficult obstacle to prevailing on a stigma damage claim.' 9 9
194. In this manner, negligence also serves the goals of equity more often than nui-
sance. Usually, the parties to a stigma case will be defendants who have caused
contamination and who have directly benefitted from the activity in question, and
plaintiffs who likely have not been responsible for the contamination event and
who will have, at most, benefitted only indirectly from the activity. Obviously,
these bare concerns may be supplemented by numerous other factors. For exam-
ple, did the owner/operator remediate the contamination immediately? Was the
contamination event the result of "midnight dumping" on the owner's property?
195. The applicable negligence standard requires that damages be actually incurred to
be recoverable. KEEToN ET AL., supra note 12, § 30, at 165.
196. See Hornstein, supra note 141, at 609 (citing Clayton P. Gillete & James E. Krier,
Risk, Courts and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027, 1092 (1990)).
197. Id.
198. See Mundy, supra note 2, at 7.
199. Indeed, a strong argument could be made that this factor will serve to restrain
the majority of potential stigma damage claims. Because it is likely that many
stigmas will, over time, disappear or become extremely small, the number ofindi-
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Any standard applied to stigma claims must ensure that only per-
manent stigma devaluation is recoverable. This obviously is the case
with nuisance law, which allows recovery of devaluation only when
the harm is permanent. 20 0 Yet, as previously stated, when courts find
actual impact, they tend to ignore the issue of permanent harm.20 1
The actual impact on property fails to provide a basis for ignoring this
factor. Negligence, too, will allow for recovery of only permanent
harm.
The second factor with which the application of a legal standard
must deal is remuneration to individuals who sell their property
before a stigma has dissipated and thus have incurred stigma-related
damage regardless of the permanence of devaluation. Any damage
rule should not create an incentive to sell property so as to incur such
extra damages. At the same time, however, a damage rule should
avoid awarding a windfall to either the buyer or seller of the property.
Only negligence accomplishes this goal.
Negligence allows recovery for actual damages incurred in the sale
of a stigmatized property and will not create an incentive to sell prop-
erty to collect stigma damages. This is because, at most, a homeowner
will be able to recover only those stigma damages that she actually
has incurred. If the homeowner manages to sell the home for a better
price, stigma damages will not be recoverable. For example, assume a
house was worth $100,000 before the contamination event, and then
the home was sold one year after the event for $90,000. Assume fur-
ther that the trier of fact, considering evidence of an appraisal and
other testimony, found that eight percent of the decrease in property
value was attributable to stigma.2 02 The home seller in this case
would be entitled to only $8000. If the home had sold for $98,000, the
seller would collect nothing because no damage would have been actu-
ally incurred. Thus, any rule allowing recovery for actually incurred
damages will not create an incentive to sell property just to recover
stigma damages.
While nuisance law allows recovery only for actually incurred dam-
ages, the requirement that harm be permanent serves to create a
windfall in those cases in which a party sells a home shortly after a
contamination event has occurred even though no permanent harm
resulted. In such a case, a home seller whose house was worth
$100,000 before the event, but is devalued by ten percent due to a
viduals seeking permanent damages may be limited. Further, the substantial
costs of litigation, including the costs of hiring experts, will serve as a deterrent
to most stigma claims except the most egregious and those in which individuals
are seeking damages for other harms. The fear of a flood of new litigation must
be considered in light of these factors.
200. See supra note 199.
201. Id.
202. The other 2% decrease is the result of different market factors.
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stigma, will lose $10,000, while the purchasers of the house ultimately
will realize a gain of a similar amount once the stigma dissipates.
While this potential outcome may influence price negotiations, it is
unlikely that the homeowner will recover the complete difference. 20 3
V. CONCLUSION
Award of damages for property devaluation due to the stigma that
accompanies environmental contamination is becoming an extremely
significant issue in environmental law. As more plaintiffs continue to
seek stigma damages, courts will be called on to develop a legal stan-
dard that properly disposes of these claims. Current stigma jurispru-
dence, the majority rule of which allows recovery only when properties
have been actually impacted, fails to analyze or address stigma claims
satisfactorily. This jurisprudence, which is based in nuisance law and
on an incomplete understanding of stigma and its causes, must be re-
considered in this nascent stage of stigma litigation. This Article has
considered some of the problems associated with these claims and has
suggested a potential solution to the problems. It also has suggested a
different and considerably better means for the assertion and analysis
of stigma claims. While stigma claims have many of the hallmarks of
emotional harm claims, they do not suffer from the same inadequacies
of subjective types of damage. Courts and attorneys will do well to
explicitly confront these and the other legal and policy concerns
presented by claims for stigma damages so as to develop a standard
that promotes a reasoned analysis of the issues.
203. This will occur for many reasons. First, the seller will be in a position of unequal
bargaining power caused by the need to sell at a time when stigma impact is still
high. Also, it is likely that there will still be incomplete information and uncer-
tainty about the contamination event at the time of sale. Due to the unequal
bargaining position, it is likely that the seller, not the buyer, will be subject to the
risks associated with the impact of the stigma harm on the property's value.
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